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ABSTRACT
We develop a methodology that intuitively characterizes the choices countries have made with respect
to the trilemma during the post Bretton-Woods period. The paper first outlines the new metrics for
measuring the degree of exchange rate flexibility, monetary independence, and capital account openness
while taking into account the recent development of substantial international reserve accumulation.
The evolution of our “trilemma indexes” illustrates that, after the early 1990s, industrialized countries
accelerated financial openness, but reduced the extent of monetary independence while sharply increasing
exchange rate stability, all reflecting the introduction of the euro. In contrast, emerging market countries
pursued exchange rate stability as their key priority up to the late 1980s while non-emerging market
developing countries has pursued it throughout the period since 1970. As a stark difference from the
latter group of countries, emerging market countries have converged towards intermediate levels of
all three indexes, characterizing managed flexibility while retaining some degree of monetary autonomy
and accelerating financial openness. This recent trend appears to be sustained by using sizable international
reserves as a buffer. We also confirm that the weighted sum of the three indexes adds up to a constant,
validating the notion that a rise in one trilemma variable should be traded-off with a drop of the weighted
sum of the other two. The second part of the paper deals with normative aspects of the trilemma, relating
the policy choices to macroeconomic outcomes such as the volatility of output growth and inflation,
and medium term inflation rates. Some key findings for developing countries include: (i) greater monetary
independence can dampen output volatility while greater exchange rate stability implies greater output
volatility, which can be mitigated by reserve accumulation; (ii) greater monetary autonomy is associated
with a higher level of inflation while greater exchange rate stability and greater financial openness
could lower the inflation level; (iii) a policy pursuit of stable exchange rate while financial development
is at the medium level can increase output volatility, (iv) greater financial openness with a high level
of financial development can reduce output volatility, though greater financial openness with a low
level of financial development can be volatility-increasing; (v) net inflow of portfolio investment and
bank lending can increase output volatility and higher levels of short-term debt or total debt services
can increase both the level and the volatility of inflation.
 
Joshua Aizenman
Department of Economics;  E2
1156 High St.
University of California, Santa Cruz












1721 SW Broadway, Suite 241
Portland, Oregon  97201
ito@pdx.edu  1
1.  Introduction  
A fundamental contribution of the Mundell-Fleming framework is the impossible trinity, 
or the trilemma, which states that a country simultaneously may choose any two, but not all, of 
the following three goals: monetary independence, exchange rate stability and financial 
integration. The trilemma is illustrated in Figure 1; each of the three sides – representing 
monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and financial integration – depicts a potentially 
desirable goal, yet it is not possible to be simultaneously on all three sides of the triangle. The 
top vertex – labeled “closed capital markets” – is, for example, associated with monetary policy 
autonomy and a fixed exchange rate regime, but not financial integration, the preferred choice of 
most developing countries in the mid to late 1980s.
1  
Over the last 20 years, most developing countries have opted for increasing financial 
integration. The trilemma implies that a country choosing this path must either forego exchange 
rate stability if it wishes to preserve a degree of monetary independence, or forego monetary 
independence if it wishes to preserve exchange rate stability.  
The purpose of this paper is to outline a methodology that will allow us to easily and 
characterize in an intuitive manner the choices countries have made with respect to the trilemma 
during the post Bretton-Woods period. The first part of our study deals with positive aspects of 
the trilemma, outlining new ways of tracing the evolving financial configurations. The second 
part deals with normative aspects of the trilemma, relating the policy decisions chosen to 
macroeconomic outcomes, such as the volatility of output growth and inflation, and medium 
term inflation rates.   
We begin by observing that over the last two decades, a growing number of developing 
countries, especially emerging market ones, have opted for hybrid exchange rate regimes – e.g., 
managed float buffered by increasing accumulation of international reserves [IR henceforth]. 
Despite the proliferation of greater exchange rate flexibility, IR/GDP ratios increased 
dramatically, especially in the wake of the East Asian crises. Practically, all the increase in 
IR/GDP holding has taken place in emerging market countries [see Figure 2]. The magnitude of 
the changes during recent years is staggering: global reserves increased from about USD 1 
trillion to more than USD 5 trillion between 1990 and 2006.  
The dramatic accumulation of international reserves has been uneven: while the IR/GDP 
ratio of industrial countries was relatively stable at approximately 4%, the IR/GDP ratio of 
developing countries increased from about 5% to about 27%. Today, about three quarters of the 
global international reserves are held by developing countries. Most of the accumulation has 
been in Asia, where reserves increased from about 5% in 1980 to about 37% in 2006 (32% in 
Asia excluding China). The most dramatic changes occurred in China, increasing its IR/GDP 
                                                 
1 See Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2005) for further discussion and references dealing with the trilemma.   2
ratio from about 1% in 1980, to about 41% in 2006 (and approaching 50% by 2008). Empirical 
studies suggest several structural changes in the patterns of reserves hoarding (Cheung and Ito, 
2007; Obstfeld, et al. 2008). A drastic change occurred in the 1990s in terms of reserve 
management among developing countries. The IR/GDP ratios shifted upwards; the ratios 
increased dramatically immediately after the East Asian crisis of 1997-98, but subsided by 2000. 
Another structural change took place in the early 2000s, mostly driven by an unprecedented 
increase in the accumulation of international reserves by China. 
The globalization of financial markets is evident in the growing financial integration of 
all groups of countries. While the original framing of the trilemma was silent regarding the role 
of reserves, recent trends suggest that reserve accumulation may be closely related to changing 
patterns of the trilemma for developing countries. The earlier literature focused on the role of 
international reserves as a buffer stock critical to the management of an adjustable-peg or 
managed-floating exchange-rate regime.
2 While useful, the buffer stock model has limited 
capacity to account for the recent development in international reserves hoarding – the greater 
flexibility of the exchange rates exhibited in recent decades should help reduce reserve 
accumulation, in contrast to the trends reported above.  
The recent literature has focused on the adverse side effects of deeper financial 
integration of developing countries – the increased exposure to volatile short-term inflows of 
capital (dubbed “hot money”), subject to frequent sudden stops and reversals (see Calvo, 1998). 
The empirical evidence suggests that international reserves can reduce both the probability of a 
sudden stop and the depth of the resulting output collapse when the sudden stop occurs.
3 
Aizenman and Lee (2007) link the large increase in reserves holding to the deepening financial 
integration of developing countries and find evidence that international reserves hoarding serves 
as a means of self-insurance against exposure to sudden stops. In extensive empirical analysis of 
the shifting determinants of international reserve holdings for more than 100 economies over the 
1975-2004 period, Cheung and Ito (2007) find that while trade openness is the only factor that is 
significant in most of the specifications and samples under consideration, its explanatory power 
has been declining over time. In contrast, the explanatory power of financial variables has been 
increasing over time.   
The increasing importance of financial integration as a determinant for international 
reserves hoarding suggests a link between the changing configurations of the trilemma and the 
level of international reserves. Indeed, Obstfeld, et al. (2008) find that the size of domestic 
financial liabilities that could potentially be converted into foreign currency (M2), financial 
                                                 
2 Accordingly, optimal reserves balance the macroeconomic adjustment costs incurred in the absence of reserves 
with the opportunity cost of holding reserves (Frenkel and Jovanovic, 1981).   
3 See Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992), Rodrik and Velasco (1999), and Aizenman and Marion (2004) for papers 
viewing international reserves as output and consumption stabilizers.   3
openness, the ability to access foreign currency through debt markets, and exchange rate policy 
are all significant predictors of international reserve stocks. 
We begin by constructing an easy and intuitive way to summarize these trends in the 
form of a “Diamond chart.” Applying the methodology outlined in the next section, we construct 
for each country a vector of trilemma and IR configurations that measures each country’s 
monetary independence, exchange rate stability, international reserves, and financial integration. 
These measures are normalized between zero and one. Each country’s configuration at a given 
instant is summarized by a “generalized diamond,” whose four vertices measure the three 
trilemma dimensions and IR holding (as a ratio to GDP).  
Figures 3 and 4 provide a concise summary of the recent history of trilemma 
configurations for different income groups and regional groups.
4 Figure 3 reveals that, over time, 
both industrialized countries and emerging market countries have moved towards deeper 
financial integration and losing monetary independence, a stark contrast from non-emerging 
market developing countries. Furthermore, emerging market countries have pursued greater 
financial integration while non-emerging market developing countries barely have. As of the 
2000s, emerging market countries distinctly differ from other groups with its balanced 
combination of the three macroeconomic policy goals as well as substantial amount of IR 
holding. 
In Figure 4, we can see that Latin American economies have liberalized their financial 
markets rapidly since the 1990s after some retrenchment during the 1980s. Emerging markets in 
Latin America reduced the extent of monetary independence in recent years and maintained a 
lower level of exchange rate stability. Emerging Asian economies have achieved comparable 
levels of exchange rate stability and financial openness while consistently reducing monetary 
independence. This group of economies differ from the other ones the most with their relatively 
balanced achievement of the three macroeconomic policy goals and their high levels of 
international reserves holding.  
Figure 5 presents the development of trilemma indexes for 50 countries (32 of which are 
developing countries) during the 1970-2006 period for which we can construct a balanced data 
set. Focusing on developing countries, we can observe an interesting trend. Comparing Figure 3b 
and 3c reveals the distinctly different trilemma patterns between emerging (EMG) and non-
emerging (non-EMG) market countries.
5 EMGs moved towards relatively more flexible 
exchange rate than Non-EMGs, buffering it by holding much higher IR/GDP, as well as towards 
                                                 
4 In each diamond chart, the origin is normalized so as to represent zero monetary independence, pure float, zero 
international reserves and financial autarky. 
5 Table 1 shows that the differences of the Trilemma indexes for monetary independence, exchange rate stability, 
and financial openness as well as international reserves holding (as a ratio to GDP) between EMGs and non-EMG 
developing countries are statistically significant.   4
higher financial integration and lower monetary independence. The figure shows that EMGs 
have experienced convergence to some middle ground among all three indexes. In contrast, non-
EMGs, on average, have not exhibited such convergence. For both groups, while the degree of 
exchange rate stability declined from the early 1970s to the early 1990s, it increased during the 
last fifteen years – though one could expect that the present crisis would induce these countries 
to move toward higher exchange rate flexibility. Currently, non-EMGs exhibit a greater degree 
of exchange rate stability and monetary independence, but a lower degree of financial integration 
compared to EMGs.  
Despite the cross-country and over-time variations in the trilemma configures, one key 
message of the trilemma is instrument scarcity – policy makers face a tradeoff, where increasing 
one trilemma variable (such as higher financial integration) would induce a drop in the weighted 
average of the other two variables (lower exchange rate stability, or lower monetary 
independence, or a combination of the two). Yet, to our knowledge, the validity of this tradeoff 
among the three trilemma variables has not been tested properly. A possible concern is that the 
trilemma framework does not impose an exact functional restriction on the association between 
the three trilemma policy variables.  
We conduct a regression analysis to test the validity of the simplest functional 
specification for the trilemma: whether the three trilemma policy goals are linearly related. For 
this purpose, we also examine and validate that the weighted sum of the three trilemma policy 
variables adds up to a constant (see Figure 7). This result confirms the notion that a rise in one 
trilemma variable should be traded-off with a drop of a linear weighted sum of the other two. 
The regression results also provide another diagnostic tool, allowing a simple description of the 
changing ranking among the three trilemma policy goals over time.  
In the second half of the paper, we investigate the normative questions pertaining to the 
trilemma. More specifically, we examine how the policy choices among the three trilemma 
policies affect output growth volatility, inflation rates, and the volatility of inflation, with focus 
on developing economies. Given that EMGs collectively have outperformed non-EMGs in terms 
of average economic growth rates, it can be the middle ground configuration of the trilemma 
policies that have contributed to the recent rapid and better development and high economic 
growth among the emerging markets. Yet, without controlling for the macroeconomic 
environment, one cannot be definitive about the causality since the middle-ground convergence 
may also be the outcome of successful take offs and prolonged growth. Our paper attempts to 
verify these issues through regression analyses, looking more systematically at the association 
between trilemma choices and economic performance. Upon investigating the link between the 
trilemma policy configurations and macroeconomic performance of the countries of our focus,   5
we also pay close attention to three other factors, namely, international reserves (IR) holding, 
financial development, and external finance.  
As has been intensively investigated in the literature, for the last decade since the Asian 
crisis of 1997-98, developing countries, especially those in East Asia and the Middle East, are 
rapidly increasing the amount of international reserves hoarding. China, the world’s largest 
holder of international reserves, currently holds about $2 trillion of reserves, accounting for 30% 
of the world’s total. As of the end of 2008, the top 10 biggest holders are all developing countries 
except for Japan, and the nine developing countries, including China, Russia, Taiwan, and Korea 
hold over 55% of international reserves available in the world. Against this backdrop, it has been 
argued that one of the main reasons for the rapid IR accumulation is countries’ desire to stabilize 
exchange rate movement. Hypothetically, one could argue that countries hold massive 
international reserves to have balanced combinations of exchange rate stability, monetary policy 
autonomy, and financial openness. Thus, evidently, one cannot discuss the issue of the trilemma 
without incorporating the effect of IR holding, which we will do in this paper. 
Secondly, the ongoing crisis has made it clear that financial development can be a 
double-edged sword. While it can enable more efficient allocation of capital, it also embraces the 
possibility of amplifying shocks to the economy. As a country may incorporate financial 
development into its decision-making process for the trilemma configurations, as China has been 
alleged to pursue closed financial markets with exchange rate stability as precautionary measures 
to protect its underdeveloped financial system, the degree of financial development could affect 
the macroeconomic performance of the economy.
6 Some also argue that countries with newly 
liberalized financial system tend to experience financial fragility (Demirguc-Kent and 
Detragiache, 1998). Thus, trilemma policy configurations need to be investigated while 
incorporating the level of financial development. 
Thirdly, as globalization proceeds with an unprecedented speed, and more countries are 
abolishing capital controls, policy makers in countries, especially developing ones, cannot ignore 
the effect of capital flows from other countries. As Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) show, the 
type, volume, and direction of capital flows has been changing over time, thus policy makers 
have to aim at moving targets in their policy decision making. Especially, considering that the 
present crisis has shown that the speed and the volume of tsunami of capital flows can be 
enormous, we must be abreast of the cost and benefit of trilemma configurations in tandem with 
those of external financing such as FDI flows, portfolio flows, and banking lending across 
countries. 
                                                 
6 See Prasad (2008) for the argument that China’s policy of exchange rate stability and closed financial markets is 
impairing the country’s macroeconomic management.   6
In the remaining of the paper, Section 2 outlines the methodology for the construction of 
our “trilemma indexes.” This section also presents summary statistics of the indexes and 
examines whether the indexes entail any structural breaks corresponding to major global 
economic events. Furthermore, in this section, we test the validity of a linear specification of the 
trilemma indexes to examine whether the notion of the trilemma can be considered to be a trade-
off and binding. Section 3 conducts more formal analysis on how the policy choices affect output 
growth volatility, inflation rates, and the volatility of inflation, with focus on developing 
economies. In Section 4, we extend our empirical investigation and examine the impact of other 
important economic variables related to the current crisis such as financial development and 
various forms of external financing. In Section 5, we make casual observations to see whether 
our empirical findings are consistent with the occurrence of the ongoing severe crises in some 
countries. We present our concluding remarks in Section 6. 
 
2.  Measures of the Trilemma Dimensions 
The empirical analysis of the tradeoffs being made requires measures of the policies. 
Unfortunately, there is a paucity of good measures; in this paper we attempt to remedy this 
deficiency by creating several indices. 
 
2.1 Construction of the Trilemma Measures 
 
Monetary Independence (MI) 
The extent of monetary independence is measured as the reciprocal of the annual 
correlation of the monthly interest rates between the home country and the base country. Money 
market rates are used.
7  
The index for the extent of monetary independence is defined as: 
MI = 
) 1 ( 1





j i i i corr
  
where i refers to home countries and j to the base country. By construction, the maximum and 
minimum values are 1 and 0, respectively. Higher values of the index mean more monetary 
policy independence.
8,9  
                                                 
7 The data are extracted from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (60B..ZF...). For the countries whose 
money market rates are unavailable or extremely limited, the money market data are supplemented by those from 
the Bloomberg terminal and also by the discount rates (60...ZF...) and the deposit rates (60L..ZF...) series from IFS. 
8 The index is smoothed out by applying the three-year moving averages encompassing the preceding, concurrent, 
and following years (t – 1, t, t+1) of observations.   7
  Here, the base country is defined as the country that a home country’s monetary policy is 
most closely linked with as in Shambaugh (2004). The base countries are Australia, Belgium, 
France, Germany, India, Malaysia, South Africa, the U.K., and the U.S. For the countries and 
years for which Shambaugh’s data are available, the base countries from his work are used, and 
for the others, the base countries are assigned based on IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) and CIA Factbook. 
 
Exchange Rate Stability (ERS) 
  To measure exchange rate stability, annual standard deviations of the monthly exchange 
rate between the home country and the base country are calculated and included in the following 
formula to normalize the index between zero and one: 





=   
Merely applying this formula can easily create a downward bias in the index, that is, it would 
exaggerate the “flexibility” of the exchange rate especially when the rate usually follows a 
narrow band, but is de- or revalued infrequently.
10 To avoid such downward bias, we also apply 
a threshold to the exchange rate movement as has been done in the literature. That is, if the rate 
of monthly change in the exchange rate stayed within +/-0.33 percent bands, we consider the 
exchange rate is “fixed” and assign the value of one for the ERS index. Furthermore, single year 
pegs are dropped because they are quite possibly not intentional ones.
11 Higher values of this 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 We note one important caveat about this index. For some countries and some years, especially early in the sample, 
the interest rate used for the calculation of the MI index is often constant throughout a year, making the annual 
correlation of the interest rates between the home and base countries (corr(ii, ij) in the formula) undefined. Since we 
treat the undefined corr the same as zero, it makes the MI index value 0.5. One might think that the policy interest 
rate being constant (regardless of the base country's interest rate) is a sign of monetary independence. However, it 
could reflect the possibility that the home country uses other tools to implement monetary policy, rather than 
manipulating the interest rates (e.g., manipulation of required reserve ratios and providing window guidance; or 
financial repression). To complicate matters, some countries have used reserves manipulation and financial 
repression to gain monetary independence while others have used both while strictly following the base country's 
monetary policy. The bottom line is that it is impossible to fully account for these issues in the calculation of MI. 
Therefore, assigning an MI value of 0.5 for such a case appears to be a reasonable compromise. However, we also 
undertake robustness checks on the index. 
10 In such a case, the average of the monthly change in the exchange rate would be so small that even small changes 
could make the standard deviation big and thereby the ERS value small.  
11  The choice of the +/-0.33 percent bands is based on the +/-2% band based on the annual rate, that is often used in 
the literature. Also, to prevent breaks in the peg status due to one-time realignments, any exchange rate that had a 
percentage change of zero in eleven out of twelve months is considered fixed. When there are two re/devaluations in 
three months, then they are considered to be one re/devaluation event, and if the remaining 10 months experience no 
exchange rate movement, then that year is considered to be the year of fixed exchange rate. This way of defining the 
threshold for the exchange rate is in line with the one adopted by Shambaugh (2004).   8




Financial Openness/Integration (KAOPEN) 
Without question, it is extremely difficult to measure the extent of capital account 
controls.
12 Although many measures exist to describe the extent and intensity of capital account 
controls, it is generally agreed that such measures fail to capture fully the complexity of real-
world capital controls. Nonetheless, for the measure of financial openness, we use the index of 
capital account openness, or KAOPEN, by Chinn and Ito (2006, 2008). KAOPEN is based on 
information regarding restrictions in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Specifically, KAOPEN is the first standardized principal 
component of the variables that indicate the presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on 
current account transactions, on capital account transactions, and the requirement of the 
surrender of export proceeds.
13 Since KAOPEN is based upon reported restrictions, it is 
necessarily a de jure index of capital account openness (in contrast to de facto measures such as 
those in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006)). The choice of a de jure measure of capital account 
openness is driven by the motivation to look into policy intentions of the countries; de facto 
measures are more susceptible to other macroeconomic effects than solely policy decisions with 
respect to capital controls.
14  
The Chinn-Ito index is normalized between zero and one. Higher values of this index 
indicate that a country is more open to cross-border capital transactions. The index is originally 
available for 181 countries for the period of 1970 through 2006.
15 The data set we examine does 
not include the United States. The Appendix presents data availability in more details. 
 
2.2 Tracking the Indexes  
Variations across Country Groupings 
  Comparing theses indexes provides some interesting insights into how the international 
financial architecture has evolved over time. For this purpose, the “diamond charts” are most 
useful. In each diamond chart, the origin is normalized so as to represent zero monetary 
                                                 
12  See Chinn and Ito (2008), Edison and Warnock (2001), Edwards (2001), Edison et al. (2002), and Kose et al. 
(2006) for discussions and comparisons of various measures on capital restrictions.  
13 This index is described in greater detail in Chinn and Ito (2008).  
14 De jure measures of financial openness also face their own limitations. As Edwards (1999) discusses, it is often 
the case that the private sector circumvents capital account restrictions, nullifying the expected effect of regulatory 
capital controls. Also, IMF-based variables are too aggregated to capture the subtleties of actual capital controls, that 
is, the direction of capital flows (i.e., inflows or outflows) as well as the type of financial transactions targeted.  
15 The original dataset covers 181 countries, but data availability is uneven among the three indexes. MI is available 
for 172 countries; ERS for 182; and KAOPEN for 178. Both MI and ERS start in 1960 whereas KAOPEN in 1970. 
For the data availability of the trilemma indexes, refer to Appendix.   9
independence, pure float, zero international reserves and financial autarky. Figure 3 summarizes 
the trends for industrialized countries, those excluding the 12 euro countries, emerging market 
countries, and non-emerging market developing countries.
16  
That figure reveals that, over time, while both industrialized countries and emerging 
market countries have moved towards deeper financial integration and losing monetary 
independence, non-emerging market developing countries have only inched toward financial 
integration and have not changed the level of monetary independence. Emerging market 
countries, after giving up some exchange rate stability during the 1980s, have not changed their 
stance on the exchange rate stability whereas non-emerging market developing countries seem to 
be remaining at or slightly oscillating around a relatively high level of exchange rate stability. 
The pursuit of greater financial integration is much more pronounced among industrialized 
countries than developing countries while emerging market countries have been increasingly 
becoming more financial open. Interestingly, emerging market countries stand out from other 
groups by achieving a relatively balanced combination of the three macroeconomic goals by the 
2000s, i.e., middle-range levels of exchange rate stability and financial integration while not 
losing as much of monetary independently as industrialized countries. The recent policy 
combination has been matched by a substantial increase in IR/GDP at a level that is not observed 
in any other groups.  
To confirm the different development paths of the trilemma indexes for the groups of 
EMGs and non-EMG developing countries for the last four decades, we conduct mean-equality 
tests on the three trilemma indexes and the IR holding ratios between EMGs and non-EMG 
developing countries. We report the test results in Table 1 and statistically confirm that the 
development path of the trilemma configurations has been different between these two groups of 
developing countries.  
  Figure 4 compares developing countries across different geographical groups. 
Developing countries in both Asia and Latin America (LATAM) have moved toward exchange 
rate flexibility, but LATAM countries have rapidly increased financial openness while Asian 
counterparts haven not. Asian emerging market economies have moved further toward financial 
openness on a level comparable with LATAM emerging market countries, yet one key difference 
between the two groups is that the former holds much more international reserves than the latter. 
More importantly, Asian emerging market countries have achieved a balanced combination of 
the three policy goals while the other groups have not, which can easily make one suspect it is 
the high volume of IR holding that may have allowed this group of countries to achieve such a 
trilemma configuration. We will revisit this issue later on. Lastly, Sub-Saharan African countries 
                                                 
16 The emerging market countries are defined as the countries classified as either emerging or frontier during the 
period of 1980-1997 by the International Financial Corporation plus Hong Kong and Singapore.    10
appear to have pursued the policy combination of exchange rate stability and monetary 
independence while lagging considerably in financial liberalization behind the other regions. 
 
Patterns in a Balanced Panel 
Figure 5 again presents the development of trilemma indexes for different subsamples 
while focusing on the time dimension of the development, but also restricts the entire sample to 
include only the countries for which all three indexes are available for the entire time period. By 
balancing the dataset, the number of countries included in the sample reduces to 50 countries out 
of which 32 countries are developing countries including 18 emerging market countries. Each 
panel presents the full sample (i.e., cross-country) average of the trilemma index of concern and 
also its one-standard deviation band. There is a striking differences between industrialized and 
developing countries as well as between emerging market and non-emerging market countries.  
The top-left panel shows that, between the late 1970s and the late 1980s, the levels of 
monetary independence are closer to each other between industrialized countries and developing 
ones. However, since the early 1990s, these two groups have been diverging from each other. 
While developing countries have been hovering around the medium levels of monetary 
independence and slightly deviating from the cross-country average, industrialized countries 
have steadily become much less monetary independent and moved farther away from the cross-
country average, reflecting the efforts made by the euro member countries.
17 In the case of the 
exchange rate stability index, after the breakup of the Bretton Woods system, industrialized 
countries significantly reduced the extent of exchange rate stability until the early 1980s. After 
the 1980s, these countries gradually, but steadily increased the extent of exchange rate stability 
to the present – though they experienced some intermittent in the early 1990s due to the EMS 
crisis.
18 Developing countries, on the other hand, maintained relatively high levels of exchange 
rate stability until the 1980s. Although these countries seem to have adopted some exchange rate 
flexibility in the early 1980s, they have since maintained constant levels of exchange rate 
stability through the early 2000s, which seems to reflect the “fear of floating.” In the last few 
years, these countries even gradually increased the level of exchange rate stability. Not 
surprisingly, industrialized countries have achieved higher levels of financial openness 
throughout the period. The acceleration of financial openness in the mid-1990s remained 
significantly high compared to the cross-country average of both the full sample and LDC 
subsample. On the other hand, developing countries also accelerated financial openness in the 
                                                 
17 When the euro countries are removed from the IDC sample, the extent of the divergence from the average 
becomes less marked although there is still a tendency among the non-euro countries to move toward lower levels of 
monetary independence. 
18 The ERS index for the non-euro industrialized countries, persistently hovers around the value of .40 throughout 
the time period after rapidly dropping in the early 1970s.   11
early 1990s after some retrenchment during the 1980s. Overall, LDC countries have been in 
parallel with the global trend of financial liberalization throughout the sample period, but the 
difference from the industrialized countries has been moderately rising in the last decade. 
Broadly speaking, the difference between emerging market countries and non-emerging 
market developing countries is smaller than that between IDC and LDC subsamples (shown in 
the bottom row of Figure 5). However, the divergence between the two groups seems to be 
becoming wider gradually since the mid-1990s. While non-EMG countries have retained 
relatively constant levels of monetary independence, EMG countries have become less monetary 
independent. As for exchange rate stability, EMG countries are persistently more flexible than 
non-emerging ones since 1980 and the difference is wider since the early 1990s. EMG countries 
have also become more financially open compared with non-EMG countries since the mid-1990s. 
Figure 6 shows the development paths of these indexes altogether, making the differences 
between IDCs and LDCs and those between EMGs and non-EMGs appear more clearly. For the 
industrialized countries, financial openness accelerated after the beginning of the 1990s and 
exchange rate stability rose after the end of the 1990s, reflecting the introduction of the euro in 
1999. The extent of monetary independence has experienced a declining trend, especially after 
the early 1990s.
19  
When we look at the group of developing countries, we can see that not only do these 
countries differ from industrialized ones, but also they differ between emerging and non-
emerging market developing countries. Up to the mid-1980s, exchange rate stability was the 
most pervasive policy among the three, though it has been on a declining trend since the early 
1970s, followed by monetary independence that has been relatively constant during the period. 
Between the mid-1980s and 2000, monetary independence and exchange rate stability became 
the most pursued policies while the level of financial openness kept rising rapidly. During the 
1990s, the level of monetary independence went up on average while more countries adopted 
floating exchange rates and liberalized financial markets. Most interestingly, since 2000, all three 
indexes have been converged to the middle ground, which we have already observed as the 
balanced achievement of the three policy goals in Figure 4. This result suggests that developing 
countries may have been trying to cling to moderate levels of both monetary independence and 
financial openness while maintaining higher levels of exchange rate stability – leaning against 
the trilemma in other words – which may explain the reason why some of these economies hold 
sizable international reserves, potentially to buffer the trade-off arising from the trilemma. 
Willett (2003) has called this compulsion by countries with a mediocre level of exchange rate 
                                                 
19 If the euro countries are removed from the sample (not reported), financial openness evolves similarly to the IDC 
group that includes the euro countries, but exchange rate stability hovers around the line for monetary independence, 
though at a bit higher levels, after the early 1990s. The difference between exchange rate stability and monetary 
independence has been slightly diverging after the end of the 1990s.   12
fixity to hoard reserves the “unstable middle” hypothesis (as opposed to the “disappearing 
middle” view).  
None of these observations are applicable to non-emerging developing market countries. 
For this group of countries, exchange rate stability has been the most pervasive policy 
throughout the period, though there is some variation, followed by monetary independence. 
There is no discernable trend in financial openness for this subsample.   
 
2.3 Identifying Structural Breaks 
  To shed more light on the evolution of the index values, we investigate whether major 
international economic events have been associated with structural breaks in the index series. We 
conjecture that major events – such as the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, the 
Mexican debt crisis of 1982 (indicating the beginning of 1980’s debt crises of developing 
countries), and the Asian Crisis of 1997-98 (the onset of sudden stop crises affecting high-
performing Asian economies (HPAEs), Russia and other emerging countries) – may have 
affected economies in such significant ways that they opted to alter their policy choices.  
  We identify the years of 1973, 1982, 1997-98, and 2001 as candidate structural breaks, 
and test the equality of the group mean of the indexes over the candidate break points for each of 
the subsample groups.
20 The results are reported in Table 2 (a). The first and second columns of 
the top panel indicate that after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the mean of the 
exchange rate stability index for the industrialized country group fell statistically significantly 
from 0.69 to 0.43, while the mean of financial openness slightly increase from 0.44 to 0.47. Non-
emerging market developing countries, however, did not significantly decrease the level of fixity 
of their exchange rates over the same time period while they became less monetarily independent 
and more financially open. Although the same changes in monetary independence and financial 
openness are also observed among emerging market economies, they did move toward more 
flexible exchange rates.  
Even after the Mexican debt crisis, industrialized countries slightly, but significantly 
increased the level of exchange rate stability and significantly increased the level of financial 
openness, while holding constant the level of monetary independence. In contrast, the debt crisis 
led all developing countries to pursue further exchange rate flexibility, most likely reflecting the 
fact that crisis countries could not sustain fixed exchange rate arrangements. However, these 
countries also simultaneously pursued more monetary independence. Interestingly, non-emerging 
                                                 
20 The data for the candidate structural break years are not included in the group means either for pre- or post-
structural break years. For the Asian crisis, we assume the years of 1997 and 1998 are the break years and therefore 
remove observations for these two years.   13
developing market countries tightened capital controls as a result of the debt crisis while 
emerging market countries did not follow the suit.   
The Asian crisis also appears to be a significant event in the evolution of the trilemma 
indexes. The level of industrialized countries’ monetary independence dropped significantly 
while their exchange rates became much more stable and their efforts of capital account 
liberalization continued, all reflecting the European countries’ movement toward economic and 
monetary union. Non-emerging market developing countries on the other hand increased the 
level of all three indexes. Emerging market countries also started liberalizing financial markets 
but much more significantly, though they lost monetary independence and slightly gained 
exchange rate stability.  
Several other major events are candidates for inducing structural breaks identified. For 
example, anecdotal accounts date globalization at the beginning of the 1990s, when many 
developing countries began to liberalize financial markets. Also, China’s entry to the World 
Trade Organization in 2001 was, in retrospect, the beginning of the country’s rise as the world’s 
manufacturer. Because the effect of these events may have often been conflated with that of the 
Asian crisis we also test whether the years of 1990 and 2001 can be structural breaks.  
The results are reported in Table 2 (b); the first two columns show the results of the mean 
equality test for the trilemma indexes with the year of 1990 as the candidate structural break 
whereas the last two columns report those with the year of 2001 as the structural break. The top 
panel shows that for industrialized countries, 1990 can be a structural break for all three indexes. 
However, when we compare the statistical magnitude of the change in the index for monetary 
independence across different candidate structural breaks (i.e., compare the t-statistics for 
monetary independence in column 4 of Table 2 (a), in column 2 of Table 2 (b), and in column 4 
of Table 2 (b)), the mean equality test is most strongly rejected for the no structural break of 
1997-98 hypothesis. We obtain the same result for exchange rate stability, though for financial 
openness, the structural break of 1990 rejects the null hypothesis the most significantly.
21 For the 
group of non-emerging market developing countries, the structural break of 1990 is the most 
significant for monetary independence and financial openness while it is the year of 2001 for 
exchange rate stability. For emerging market countries, however, the most significant structural 
break is found to have occurred in 2001 for monetary independence and exchange rate stability, 
and in 1997-98 for financial openness. 
                                                 
21 The finding that both monetary independence and exchange rate stability entail structural breaks around the Asian 
crisis can be driven merely by the countries that adopted the euro in 1999. We repeat the same exercise using the 
industrial countries sample without the euro countries, and find that the structural breaks for monetary independence 
and financial opens remain the same as in the full IDC sample (1997-98 and 1990, respectively), but that the 
exchange rate stability series is found to have a structural break in 2001. Also, the change in the exchange rate 
stability series is negative (i.e., further exchange rate flexibility) in both 1990 and 2001.   14
Lastly, we compare the t-statistics across different structural breaks for each of the 
indexes and subsamples. Given that the balanced dataset is used in this exercise, the largest t-
statistics should indicate the most significant structural break for the series. For example, 
industrial countries’ monetary independence and exchange rate stability series have the largest t-
statistics when the structural break of 1997-98 is tested.
22 For financial openness, however, the 
year of 1990 is identified with the largest structural break. The results for other variables and 
subsamples are shown in Table 2 (c). For non-emerging LDC and EMG countries, the debt crisis 
is found to be the most significant structural break for exchange rate stability. The year of 1990 
is the most significant structural break for monetary independence and financial openness for 
non-emerging developing market countries, whereas the year of 2001 and the Asian crisis of 
1997-98 are, respectively, for emerging market countries.  
 
2.4 The Linear Relationships between the Trilemma Indexes 
  While the preceding analyses are quite informative on the evolution of international 
macroeconomic policy orientation, we have not shown whether these three macroeconomic 
policy goals are “binding” in the context of the impossible trinity. That is, it is important for us to 
confirm that countries have faced the trade-offs based on the trilemma. A challenge facing a full 
test of the trilemma tradeoff is that the trilemma framework does not impose any obvious 
functional form on the nature of the tradeoffs between the three trilemma variables. To illustrate 
this concern, we note that the instrument scarcity associated with the trilemma implies that 
increasing one trilemma variable, say higher financial integration, should induce lower exchange 
rate stability, or lower monetary independence, or a combination of these two policy 
adjustments.
23 Yet, the nature of the trade-off is not specified. Hence, we test the validity of a 
simplest possible trilemma specification – a linear tradeoff. Specifically, we test that the 
weighted sum of the three trilemma policy variables adds up to a constant. This reduces to 
examining the goodness of fit of this linear regression: 
 
t   + + = 1 ε + i,t j i,t j i,t j KAOPEN c ERS b MI a    where j can be either IDC, ERM, or LDC.           (1) 
 
Because we have shown that different subsample groups of countries have experienced different 
development paths, we allow the coefficients on all the variables to vary across different groups 
                                                 
22 When the sample is restricted to non-euro IDCs, the most significant structural break for exchange rate stability is 
found to be 1973, the year when the Bretton Woods system collapsed, while those for monetary independence and 
financial openness are unchanged. 
23 More generally, increasing of one Trilemma variable should induce a drop of the second Trilemma variable, or a 
drop in the third Trilemma variable, or a combination of the two.   15
of countries – industrialized countries, the countries that have been in the European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM), and developing countries – allowing for interactions between the 
explanatory variables and the dummies for these subsamples.
24 The regression is run for the full 
sample period as well as the subsample periods identified in the preceding subsection. The 
results are reported in Table 3. 
  The rationale behind this exercise is that policy makers of an economy must choose a 
weighted average of the three policies in order to achieve a best combination of the two. Hence, 
if we can find the goodness of fit for the above regression model is high, it would suggest a 
linear specification is rich enough to explain the trade off among the three policy dimensions. In 
other words, the lower the goodness of fit, the weaker the support for the existence of the trade-
off, suggesting either that the theory of the trilemma is wrong, or that the relationship is non-
linear. 
Secondly, the estimated coefficients in the above regression model should give us some 
approximate estimates of the weights countries put on the three policy goals. However, the 
estimated coefficients alone will not provide sufficient information about “how much of” the 
policy choice countries have actually implemented. Hence, looking into the predictions using the 
estimated coefficients and the actual values for the variables (such as  MI a ˆ ,  ERS b ˆ , and 
KAOPEN c ˆ   ) will be more informative. 
Thirdly, by comparing the predicted values based on the above regression, i.e., 
KAOPEN c ERS b MI a ˆ ˆ ˆ + + , over a time horizon, we can obtain some inferences regarding how 
“binding” the trilemma is. If the trilemma is found to be linear, the predicted values should hover 
around the value of 1, and the prediction errors should indicate how much of the three policy 
choices have been “not fully used” or to what extent the trilemma is “not binding.” 
Table 3 presents the regression results. The results from the regression with the full 
sample data are reported in the first column, and the others for different subsample periods are in 
the following columns. First of all, the adjusted R-squared for the full sample model as well as 
for the subsample periods is found to be above 94%, which indicates that the three policy goals 
are linearly related to each other, that is, countries face the trade-off among the three policy 
options. Across different time periods, the estimated coefficients vary, suggesting that countries 
alter over time the weights on the three policy goals.  
Figure 7 illustrates the goodness of fit from a different angle. In the top panels, the solid 
lines show the means of the predicted values (i.e.,  KAOPEN c ERS b MI a ˆ ˆ ˆ + + ) based on the full 
sample model in the first column of Table 3 for the groups of industrial countries (left) and 
                                                 
24 The dummy for ERM countries is assigned for the countries and years that corresponds to participation in the 
ERM (i.e., Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, and Italy from 1979 on, Spain from 1989, U.K. only for 
1990-91, Portugal from 1992, Austria from 1995, Finland from 1996, and Greece from 1999).   16
developing countries (right).
25 To incorporate the time variation of the predictions, the subsample 
mean of the prediction values as well as their 95% confidence intervals (that are shown as the 
shaded areas) are calculated using five-year rolling windows.
26 The panels also display the 
rolling means of the predictions using the coefficients and actual values of only two of the three 
trilemma terms –  ERS b MI a ˆ ˆ +  (brown line with diamond nodes),  KAOPEN c MI a ˆ ˆ +  (green line 
with circles),  KAOPEN c ERS b ˆ ˆ +  (orange line with “x”).  
From these panels of figures, we can first see that the predicted values based on the 
model hover around the value of one closely for both subsamples. For the group of industrial 
countries, the prediction average is statistically below the value of one in the late 1970s through 
the beginning of the 1990s. However, since then, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
mean of the prediction values is one, indicating that the trilemma is “binding” for industrialized 
countries. For developing countries, the model is under-predicting from the end of the 1970s 
through the mid-1990s. However, unlike the IDC group, the mean of the predictions has become 
statistically smaller than one since 2000. At the very least, for both subsamples, the mean of the 
predictions never rises above the value of one in statistical sense, implying that, despite some 
years when the trilemma is not binding, the three macroeconomic policies are linearly related 
with each other.
27 
The top panels also show that, among industrialized countries, the policy combination of 
increasing exchange rate stability and more financial openness rapidly became prevalent after the 
beginning of the mid-1990s. Among developing countries, the policy combinations of monetary 
independence and exchange rate stability has been quite dominant throughout the sample period 
while the policy combination of exchange rate stability and financial openness has been the least 
prevalent over, most probably reflecting the bitter experiences of currency crises. 
                                                 
25 For this exercise, predictions also incorporate the interactions with the dummy variables shown in Table 3.  
26 Both the mean and the standard errors of the predicted values are calculated using the rolling five-year windows. 
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, respectively, where n refers to the number of countries in a subsample (i.e., IDC and 
LDC),  it x ˆ  to the prediction values, and  4 | − t t x  to the mean of it x ˆ  in the rolling five-year window.  
Because of the use of rolling five-year windows, the lines in the figures only start in 1974. 
27 One may question the uniqueness of this regression exercise by pointing at the left-hand side variable being an 
identity scalar. As a robustness check, we ran a regression of MIi,t on ERSi,t and KAOPENi,t, recovered the estimated 
coefficients for aj, bj, and cj.in equation (1), and recreated panels of figures comparable to those in Figure 7. These 
alternative figures appeared to be very much comparable to Figure 7 and therefore confirmed our conclusions about 
the linearity of the trilemma indexes as well as the development of the subsample mean of prediction values based 
on equation (1).    17
  In the lower panels, we can observe the contributions of each policy orientation (i.e., 
MI a ˆ ,  ERS b ˆ , and  KAOPEN c ˆ ) for the IDC and LDC groups.
28 While less developed countries 
maintained high, though fluctuating, levels of monetary independence, both exchange rate 
stability and financial integration remained at much lower levels throughout the period with the 
former moderately declining and the latter slightly increasing. In the last decade or so, while 
monetary independence is on a declining trend, the gap between the predictions based on 
exchange rate stability and financial openness has been somewhat shrinking. This may indicate 
that more countries tend to try to achieve certain levels of exchange rate stability and financial 
openness together while maintaining high levels of monetary independence. This kind of effort 
can be done only when the countries accumulate high levels of international reserves that allow 
them to intervene in foreign exchange markets, consistent with the fact that many developing 
countries increased international reserves in the aftermath of the Asian crisis of 1997-98. 
However, as the concept of the trilemma predicts, this sort of environment must involve a rise in 
the costs of sterilized intervention especially when the actual volume of cross-border transactions 
of financial assets increase and when there is no reversal in the three policies.
29 This seems to 
explain the drop in the level of monetary independence after 2000 for this group of countries.
30 
The experience of the industrialized countries casts a stark contrast. Although monetary 
independence was also IDC’s top priority until the 1990s, it yielded to financial integration in the 
late 1990s and to exchange rate stability in the early 2000s. The trend of financial liberalization 
and exchange rate stability correspond to declines in the level of monetary independence, which 
persistently kept falling and became the lowest priority in the 2000s. Such changes in the relative 
weights of the three policy goals do not require the countries to accumulate international reserves 




3. Regression Analyses 
  Although the above characterization of the trilemma indexes allows us to observe the 
development of policy orientation among countries, it fails to identify countries’ motivations for 
policy changes. Hence, we examine econometrically how various choices regarding the three 
                                                 
28 They are again the means based on five-year rolling windows. 
29 Refer to Aizenman and Glick (2008) and Glick and Hutchison (2008) for more analysis on the limit of sterilized 
intervention. 
30 When this exercise is repeated for both the emerging market country (EMG) group and the non-emerging market 
developing country group (Non-EMG LDC), the results remain about the same, only except for that the financial 
liberalization is more evident for the EMG group; the drop in the level of monetary independence is larger; and the 
gap between the predictions based on exchange rate stability and financial openness has been shrinking further. 
31 We also repeat the exercise using the regression models (whose results shown in Table 3) for each of the 
subsample period (excluding the break years). The results (not reported) are qualitatively the same as in Figure 7.   18
policies affect final policy goals, namely, output growth stability, low inflation, and inflation 
stability. 
The basic model we estimate is given by: 
it i t it it it it it it D Z X TR TLM TR TLM y ε α α α α + Φ + Γ + Β + × + + + = ) ( 3 2 1 0    (2) 
yit is the measure for macro policy performance for country i in year t. More specifically, yit is 
either output volatility measured as the five-year standard deviations of the growth rate of per 
capita real output (using Penn World Table 6.2); inflation volatility as the five-year standard 
deviations of the monthly rate of inflation; or the five-year average of the monthly rate of 
inflation. TLMit is a vector of any two of the three trilemma indexes, namely, MI, ERS, and 
KAOPEN.
32 TRit is the level of international reserves (excluding gold) as a ratio to GDP, and 
(TLMit x TRit) is an interaction term between the trilemma indexes and the level of international 
reserves. We are particularly interested in the effect of the interaction terms because we suspect 
that international reserves may complement or substitute for other policy stances. 
Xit is a vector of macroeconomic control variables that include the variables most used in 
the literature, namely, relative income (to the U.S. based on PWT per capita real income); its 
quadratic term; trade openness (=(EX+IM)/GDP); the TOT shock as defined as the five-year 
standard deviation of trade openness times TOT growth; fiscal procyclicality (as the correlations 
between HP-detrended government spending series and HP-detrended real GDP series); M2 
growth volatility (as five-year standard deviations of M2 growth); private credit creation as a 
ratio to GDP as a measure of financial development; the inflation rate; and inflation volatility. Zt 
is a vector of global shocks that includes change in U.S. real interest rate; world output gap; and 
relative oil price shocks (measured as the log of the ratio of oil price index to the world’s CPI). 
Di is a set of characteristic dummies that includes a dummy for oil exporting countries and 
regional dummies. Explanatory variables that persistently appear to be statistically insignificant 
are dropped from the estimation.  it ε  is an i.i.d. error term.  
The data set is organized into five-year panels of 1972-1976, 1977-81, 1982-1986, 1987-
91, 1992-96, 1997-2001, 2002-06. All time-varying variables are included as five-year averages. 
The full sample is divided into the groups of industrialized countries (IDC) and developing 
countries (LDC) which also includes a subgroup of commodity exporters (COMMOD-LDC), i.e., 
developing countries that are either exporters of fuel or those of non-fuel primary products as   
defined by the World Bank, and a subgroup of emerging market countries (EMG). We report the 
results only for the last three groups, i.e., only subsamples related to developing countries. 
                                                 
32 In Table 3, we have shown that these three measures of the trilemma are linearly related. Therefore, it is most 
reasonable to include two of the indexes concurrently, not just individually nor all three collectively.   19
Since inflation volatility turned out to be a significant explanatory variable for the 
regressions for output volatility and the level of inflation, and also the inflation level for the 
regressions for inflation volatility, we need to implement an estimation method that handles 
outliers properly. Hence, we decide to use the robust regression method which downweights 
outliers.
33 Also, we remove the observations if their values of inflation volatility are greater than 
a value of 30 or the rate of inflation (as an explanatory variable) is greater than 100%. 
Furthermore, for comparison purposes, the same set of explanatory variables is used for the three 
subsamples except for the regional dummies.  
 
3.1 Estimation of the Basic Model 
3.1.1 Output Volatility  
  The regression results for the estimation on output volatility are shown in Tables 4-1 
through 4-3 for the three subsamples of developing countries, i.e., developing countries, 
developing commodity exporters, and emerging market countries. Different specifications are 
tested using different combinations of the trilemma indexes as well as their interaction terms. 
The results are presented in columns 1 through 6 in each table.
34 The variables that consistently 
appear to be statistically insignificant are dropped from the estimations. 
The model explains well the output volatility for the developing countries subsample 
(Table 4-1). Across different model specifications, the following is true for the group of 
developing countries: The higher the level of income is (relative to the U.S.), the more reduced 
output volatility is, though the effect is nonlinear. The bigger change occurs on U.S. real interest 
rate, the higher output volatility of developing countries may become, indicating that the U.S. 
real interest rate may represent the debt payment burden on these countries. The higher TOT 
shock there is, the higher output volatility countries experience, consistent with Rodrik (1998) 
and Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2001) who argue that volatility in world goods through trade 
openness can raise output volatility.
35 Countries with procyclical fiscal policy tend to experience 
more output volatility while oil exporters also experience more output volatility.
36  
                                                 
33 The robust regression procedure conducts iterative weighted least squares regressions while downweighting 
observations that have larger residuals until the coefficients converge. 
34 The dummies for “East Asia and Pacific” and “Sub-Saharan Africa” are included in the model for developing 
countries, but not reported to conserve space. 
35 The effect of trade openness is found to have insignificant effects for all subgroups of countries and is therefore 
dropped from the estimations. This finding reflects the debate in the literature, in which both positive (i.e., volatility 
enhancing) and negative (i.e., volatility reducing) effects of trade openness has been evidenced. The volatility 
enhancing effect in the sense of Easterly et al. (2001) and Rodrik (1998) is captured by the term for (TOT*Trade 
Openness) volatility. For the volatility reducing effect of trade openness, refer to Calvo et al. (2004), Cavallo (2005, 
2007), and Cavallo and Frankel (2004). The impact of trade openness on output volatility also depends on the type 
of trade, i.e., whether it is inter-industry trade (Krugman, 1993) or intra-industry trade (Razin and Rose,1994). 
36 Countries in East Asia and Pacific as well as in Sub Sahara Africa tend to experience more output volatility 
(results not reported).   20
Countries with more developed financial markets tend to experience lower output 
volatility, a result consistent with the theoretical predictions by Aghion, et al. (1999) and 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) as well as past empirical findings such as Blankenau, et al. 
(2001) and Kose et al. (2003). This result indicates that economies armed with more developed 
financial markets are able to mitigate output volatility, perhaps by allocating capital more 
efficiently, lowering the cost of capital, and/or ameliorating information asymmetries (King and 
Levine, 1993, Rajan and Zingales, 1998, Wurgler, 2000). We will revisit this issue later on. 
Among the trilemma indexes, only the monetary independence variable is found to have a 
significant effect on output volatility; the greater monetary independence one embraces, the less 
output volatility the country tends to experience. This finding is no surprise, considering that 
stabilization measures should reduce output volatility, especially more so under higher degree of 
monetary independence.
37 Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) find that countries that adopt 
inflation targeting – one form of increasing monetary independence – are found to reduce output 
volatility, and that the effect is bigger among emerging market countries.
38 This volatility 
reducing effect of monetary independence may explain the tendency that developing countries, 
especially, non-emerging market ones, try not to reduce the extent of monetary independence 
over years. 
Like other developing countries, less developed commodity exporting countries are also 
susceptible to changes in U.S. real interest rates and TOT shocks, but other variables do not 
exhibit the same effects (Table 4-2). Again, countries with greater monetary independence tend 
to experience lower output volatility. Interestingly, more exchange rate stability per se does not 
have any significant impact on output volatility, but if it is coupled with higher levels of 
international reserves holding, then countries can reduce output volatility, which may help 
explain the recent buildup of international reserves by developing, especially oil exporting, 
countries. Additionally, more financially open commodity exporters seem able to reduce output 
volatility, though, interestingly, the coefficient on the interaction term between KAOPEN and 
international reserve holding is significantly positive in one of the models. This result indicates 
that countries with higher levels of reserves holding than 27% of GDP can experience more 
output volatility. This result is somewhat counterintuitive.  
                                                 
37 This finding can be surprising to some if the concept of monetary independence is taken synonymously to central 
bank independence because many authors, most typically Alesina and Summers (1993), have found more 
independent central banks would have no or little at most impact on output variability. However, in this literature, 
the extent of central bank independence is usually measured by the legal definition of the central bankers and/or the 
turnover ratios of bank governors, which can bring about different inferences compared to our measure of monetary 
independence. 
38 The link is not always predicted to be negative theoretically. When monetary authorities react to negative supply 
shocks, that can amplify the shocks and exacerbate output volatility. Cechetti and Ehrmann (1999) find the positive 
association between adoption of inflation targeting and output volatility.   21
While emerging market countries share many of the same traits in macroeconomic 
variables as those in the LDC sample, the results on the trilemma indexes are a little different. 
Countries with more stable exchange rate tend to experience higher output volatility, which 
conversely implies that countries with more flexible exchange rates will experience lower levels 
of output volatility, as was found in Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2005) and Haruka (2007). 
However, the interaction term is found to have a statistically negative effect, suggesting that 
countries holding high levels of international reserves are able to reduce output volatility. The 
threshold level of international reserves holding is 21-24% of GDP. Singapore, a country with a 
middle level of exchange rate stability (0.50 in the 2002-06 period) and a very high level of 
international reserves holding (100% as a ratio of GDP), is able to reduce the output volatility by 
2.65-3.2 percentage points.
39 China, whose exchange rate stability index is as high as 0.97 and 
whose ratio of reserves holding to GDP is 40% in 2006, is able to reduce volatility by 1.1-1.5 
percentage points. The estimation results on the trilemma variables are summarized in Table 7.
40 
Figure 8 graphically shows the marginal interactive effects between ERS and IR based on 
the estimates from Column 2 of Table 4-3. For presentation purposes, in the figure, the EMG 
group of countries is divided into (a) the Asian group, (b) the Latin American group, and (c) the 
other EMG countries. In all the panels of figures, the contours are drawn to present different 
levels of the effect of ERS on output volatility conditional on the level of IR. Also, the solid 
horizontal line refers to the threshold of IR at 21% of GDP, above which higher levels of ERS 
will have a negative impact on output volatility.
41 For example, the solid line of contour above 
the threshold shows the combinations of ERS and IR that leads to a one percentage point 
reduction in the output volatility. In the figure, we can see that the further toward the northeast 
corner in the panel, i.e., the higher level of ERS and IR a country pursues, the more negative 
impact it can have on output volatility. Below the threshold, however, it is true that the further 
toward the southeast corner, i.e., the higher level of ERS and the lower level of IR a country 
pursues, the more positive impact it can have on output volatility. In each of the panels, the 
scatter diagrams of ERS and IR are superimposed. The black circles indicate ERS and IR for the 
period of 2002-06 and the red “x’s” for the 1992-96 period.  
                                                 
39 See Moreno and Spiegel (1997) for earlier study of trilemma configurations in Singapore.  
40 Following Acemoglu (2003), we also suspect institutional development plays a role in reducing output volatility. 
To measure the level of institutional development, we use the variable LEGAL, which is the first principal 
component of law and order (LAO), anti-corruption measures (CORRUPT), and bureaucracy quality (BQ). However, 
it turns out that the LEGAL variable is statistically insignificant and sometimes with the wrong sign (not reported). 
Given small variations in the time series of the variable, this result is not surprising. 
41 We also note that the estimated coefficient on IR (level) is significantly positive in Columns (2) and (6) of Table 
4-3, which indicates that, while a higher level of IR holding can lessen the positive effect of ERS, a higher level of 
IR holding itself is volatility-enhancing. This is not captured in Figure 8 since we focused on the effect of ERS and 
how it changes depending on the level of IR.    22
Using these diagrams, we can make several interesting observations. First, between the 
1992-96 and 2002-06 periods, a period which encompasses the last wave of global crises, i.e., the 
Asian crisis of 1997-98, the Russian crisis of 1998, and the Argentina crisis of 2001-02, many 
countries, especially those in East Asia and Eastern Europe, increased their IR holding above the 
threshold. Secondly, the movement is not necessarily toward the northeast direction. Rather, it is 
around the threshold level where the effect of ERS is neutral (i.e., zero percentage point impact), 
unless they move much higher toward output volatility-reducing territory (such as China and 
Bulgaria). Thirdly, while we observe a moderately positive association between ERS and IR, 
none of these observations are applicable to Latin American countries. Lastly, there are not many 
countries that have achieved combinations of ERS and IR to reduce output volatility significantly. 
Countries such as Botswana, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Jordan, and Singapore are more of 
exceptions. However, at the very least, these estimation results should explain why many 
countries, especially those with the intention of pursuing greater exchange rate stability, are 
motivated to hold a massive amount of international reserves.  
 
3.1.2 Inflation Volatility  
  We repeat the exercise for inflation volatility. The results for subsamples of developing 
countries are reported in Tables 5-1 through 5-3 and summarized in Table 7.  
  Across different subsamples, countries with higher relative income tend to experience 
lower inflation volatility, and naturally, those with higher levels of inflation are expected to 
experience higher inflation volatility. The TOT shock is found to increase inflation volatility. 
Furthermore, for commodity exporters, oil price increases would lead to higher inflation 
volatility. 
  The performance of the trilemma indexes appears to be the weakest for this group of 
estimations overall. Monetary independence is found to be an inflation volatility decreasing 
factor for commodity exporters. However, given that it is also an output volatility decreasing 
factor for this group of countries, this finding is somewhat counterintuitive. 
  Emerging market countries, on the other hand, tend to experience higher inflation 
volatility if they are more open to capital account transactions. This significantly positive effect 
of financial openness may be capturing financial turbulence that can arise as a result of financial 
liberalization policy. In fact, when we include the interaction term between the crisis dummy and 
the financial openness variable, the statistical significance of the financial openness variable 
declines while the interaction term enters the estimation marginally significantly.
42 
                                                 
42 The currency crisis dummy variable is derived from the conventional exchange rate market pressure (EMP) index 
pioneered by Eichengreen et al. (1996). The EMP index is defined as a weighted average of monthly changes in the 
nominal exchange rate, the international reserve loss in percentage, and the nominal interest rate. The weights are 
inversely related to the pooled variance of changes in each component over the sample countries, and adjustment is   23
 
3.1.3. Medium-run Level of Inflation 
Tables 6-1 through 6-3 show the results for the regressions on the level of inflation. 
These three tables report that countries with higher inflation volatility, M2 growth volatility, and 
oil price shocks tend to experience higher output volatility. Also, when the world economy is 
experiencing a boom, developing countries tend to experience higher inflation, which 
presumably reflects strong demand for goods produced and exported by developing countries. 
Countries with more monetary autonomy tend to experience higher inflation. From the 
perspective that greater monetary independence should be synonymous with a more independent 
central bank, most typically exemplified by the literature of time-inconsistency in monetary 
policy, a country with greater monetary independence should be able to lower inflation.
43 One 
possible explanation would be that countries with higher levels of monetary independence 
attempt to monetize their debt and cause higher inflation. Such countries may be better off if they 
are not monetarily independent and just import monetary policy from other countries through 
fixed exchange rate arrangements.  
As a matter of fact, in all three subsamples, higher exchange rate stability is found to lead 
countries to experience lower inflation, a result consistent with the literature (such as Ghosh et 
al., 1997). This finding and the previously found positive association between exchange rate 
stability and output volatility are in line with the theoretical prediction that establishing stable 
exchange rates is a trade-off issue for policy makers; it will help the country to achieve lower 
inflation by showing a higher level of credibility and commitment, but at the same time, the 
efforts of maintaining stable exchange rates will rid the policy makers of an important 
adjustment mechanism through fluctuating exchange rates – which would explain the negative 
coefficient on monetary independence in the output volatility regressions.  
Furthermore, for the LDC group, the interaction term between ERS and international 
reserves holding is found to have a positive impact on the rate of inflation. Models 2 and 6 in 
Table 6-1 show that if the ratio of reserves holding to GDP is greater than 53% or 65%, 
respectively, the efforts of pursuing exchange rate stability can help increase the level of 
inflation. Although these levels of reserves holding are very high, this means that countries with 
excess levels of reserves holding will eventually face the limit in the efforts of fully sterilizing 
                                                                                                                                                             
made for the countries that experienced hyperinflation following Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). For countries 
without data to compute the EMP index, the currency crisis classifications in Glick and Hutchison (2001) and 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) are used.  
43 In other words, more independent central bankers should be able to remove the inflation bias (Kydland and 
Prescott, 1977 and Barro and Gordon, 1983).   24
foreign exchange intervention to maintain exchange rate stability, thereby experiencing higher 
inflation.
44  
Lastly, models (3) through (6) in all subsamples show that the more financially open a 
developing country is, the lower inflation it will experience. Interestingly, the more open to trade 
a country is, the more likely it is to experience lower inflation, though this effect is weakly 
significant only for the LDC group.  
As globalization became actively debated, the negative association between “openness” 
and inflation was more frequently remarked upon.
45 Romer (1993), extending the Barro-Gordon 
(1983) model, theorized and empirically verified that the more open to trade a country becomes, 
the less motivated its monetary authorities are to inflate, suggesting a negative link between trade 
openness and inflation. Razin and Binyamini (2007) predicted that both trade and financial 
liberalization will flatten the Phillips curve, so that policy makers will become less responsive to 
output gaps and more aggressive in fighting inflation.
46 Here, across different subsamples of 
developing countries, we present evidence consistent with the negative openness-inflation 
relationship. 
 
3.2. How Does a Policy Orientation Affect Macroeconomic Performance? 
Composite Indexes for Policy Orientation 
As we have already seen, decisions on which two of the three policy goals – monetary 
independence, exchange rate stability, and financial integration – to retain, or which one to give 
up, characterizes the international financial regime a country decides to implement. For example, 
currency unions such as the Euro countries and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or countries 
with currency boards like Argentina before 2001 require member countries to abandon monetary 
independence, but retain exchange rate stability and financial openness. The Bretton Woods 
system kept countries financially closed, but let them exercise an independent monetary policy 
and to stabilize their currency values. Thus, measures constructed by two of the above three 
indexes can allow one to summarize the policy orientations of countries. In other words, 
measures composed of two of the three indexes should be able to show how close countries are 
to the “vertex” of the trilemma triangle. 
  For this purpose, we construct composite indexes based on two of the above three 
measures. The principal component of MI and ERS measures how close countries (MI_ERS) are 
                                                 
44 Aizenman and Glick (2008) and Glick and Hutchison (2008) show that China, whose ratio of reserves holding to 
GDP is estimated to be 50%, has started facing more inflationary pressure in 2007 as a result of intensive market 
interventions to sustain exchange rate stability (though the onset of global crisis has reversed these trends). 
45 Rogoff (2003) argues that globalization contributes to dwindling mark-ups, and thereby, disinflation. 
46 Loungani et al. (2001) provides empirical evidence that countries with greater restrictions on capital mobility face 
steeper Phillips curves.   25
toward the vertex of “closed economy” whereas that of ERS and KAOPEN (ERS_KAO) refers to 
the vertex of currency union or currency board, and that of MI and KAOPEN (MI_KAO) to 
“floating exchange rate.” Again, all three indexes are normalized between zero and one. Higher 
values indicate a country is closer toward the vertex of the trilemma triangle.  
 
Estimation with Composite Indexes 
  Columns 7 though 12 in Tables 4-1 through 6-3 show the estimation results for different 
models each of which include one composite index and its interaction with reserves holding. 
Tables 4-1 and 4-2 show that countries with higher MI_KAO, i.e., countries with more flexible 
exchange rates, tend to experience lower output volatility, which is in line with the oft-argued 
automatic stabilizing role of flexible exchange rates. For developing countries, the more 
financially closed an economy is (the higher its MI_ERS is), output volatility tends to be lower. 
Given that monetary independence is found to have a volatility reducing effect in the estimations 
with individual trilemma indexes, it is monetary independence that leads to lower output 
volatility whether financially closed economies with more stable exchange rates or financially 
open but with more flexible exchange rates. Emerging market economies (Table 4-3), on the 
other hand, seem to follow different dynamics. Economies with higher MI_ERS, i.e., more 
closed financial markets, are able to reduce output volatility only when they hold ample reserves.  
  In Tables 5-1 through 5-3, we see that developing countries or emerging market 
economies with higher exchange rate stability and more financial openness (ERS and KAO), or 
those with weaker monetary independence, tend to experience higher inflation volatility. 
Commodity exporters that pursue greater monetary independence and financial openness (MI 
and KAO) tend to experience less inflation volatility (Table 5-2). 
  The level of inflation can be lowered if a developing or commodity-exporting country 
pursues greater monetary independence and more stable exchange rates (Columns 7 and 8 in 
Tables 6-1 and 6-2). Or, if developing countries, whether commodity-exporting or emerging 
market ones, pursue a policy combination of greater exchange rate stability and more financial 
openness, these economies should be able to lower the level of inflation. This finding can be 
disappointing news for monetary authorities because it implies that, to implement disinflationary 
policy, policy makers should yield monetary policy making to another country and invite more 
policy discipline by opening financial markets. 
 
4.  Further Analyses of the Trilemma Configurations on Macro-Performance  
While the above analysis sheds important light on how the trilemma configurations affect 
macroeconomic performance of the economies, other important questions, especially those 
which have emerged out of the ongoing financial crisis, are not directly addressed. In this section,   26
we further investigate the following two more issues. First, we take a closer look at the effect of 
financial development on output volatility. Secondly, we examine the impacts of external 
financing on output volatility, inflation volatility, and the medium-term level of inflation.  
 
4.1 Interactions Between the Trilemma Configurations and Financial Development 
  The ongoing global financial crisis has illustrated that financial development can be a 
double-edged sword. While further financial development may enhance output growth and 
stability by ameliorating information asymmetry, enabling more efficient capital allocation, and 
allowing for further risk sharing, it can also expose economies to high-risk, high-return financial 
instruments, thereby involving the possibility of amplifying real shocks and/or falling into the 
boom-burst cycles. Naturally, the effect of financial development deserves further investigation, 
which we are about to conduct. 
  In Tables 4-1 through 4-3, we have seen that more financial development can lead to less 
output volatility, but its effect is significant only for the LDC subsample. One may also wonder 
how trilemma configurations can interact with the level of financial development. There is no 
question that monetary policy with high levels of authorities’ independence, which is found to be 
volatility-reducing, should work better with more developed financial markets. Exchange rate 
stability, which can lead to higher output volatility, may be less disturbing if financial markets 
handle capital allocation more efficiently. Financial liberalization can easily be expected to work 
hand in hand with financial development to reduce economic volatility.  
  With these assumptions, we test to see if there is any interaction between the trilemma 
indexes and financial development which we measure using private credit creation as a ratio to 
GDP (PCGDP). The results turn out to be simply futile; when the previous output volatility 
regressions from Tables 4-1 through 4-3 are repeated, including interaction terms between the 
trilemma indexes and PCGDP, none of the interaction terms turn out to be significant (not 
reported). These results are not surprising or discouraging, because, as we already mentioned, we 
suspect that the effect of financial development can be ambiguous.  
  The weakness of using interaction terms is that we must assume that the effect of 
PCGDP on the link between the trilemma indexes and output volatility is monotonic; a higher 
level of PCGDP must either enhance, have no impact on, or lessen the link. Given the 
insignificance of the interaction terms from the initial investigation, we suspect the nonlinearity 
of PCGDP. As such, we decide to use the dummies for different level groups of PCGDP.
47 That 
is, PCGDP_HI is assigned a value of one for a country if the country’s PCGDP is above the 75
th 
percentile in the distribution of five-year averages of PCGDP within a five-year window, and 
                                                 
47 This investigation is motivated by Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005), who examines the nonlinear effect of structural 
variables, including financial development, on the output volatility-growth link.   27
zero, otherwise. PCGDP_LO takes a value of one if the country’s PCGDP is below the 25
th 
percentile, and zero, otherwise. PCGDP_MD takes a value of one if the country’s PCGDP lies 
between the 25
th and 75
th percentiles in a five-year period. We interact these level category 
dummies with the trilemma indexes and include the interaction terms in the output volatility 
regressions, hoping to capture the nonlinear effect of financial development on the link between 
the trilemma configurations and output volatility. 
  Table 8 reports the estimation results only for the PCGDP variable and the interaction 
terms for the developing countries subsample (Columns 1-3) and the emerging market countries 
subsample (Columns 4-6) in order to conserve space. At the bottom of the tables, we also report 
the Wald test statistics for the tests on the differences in the estimated coefficients of the 
interaction terms between the trilemma indexes and different PCGDP groups.  
  In Columns 1-3, we can see that this analysis does not yield any significant results for the 
group of developing countries. Exchange rate stability may contribute to higher output volatility 
if the country is equipped with medium (or higher) levels of financial development while the low 
level of financial development may contribute to reducing output volatility, though none of the 
estimated coefficients are significant.  
Among EMGs (Columns 4-6), we see more interesting results. The estimated coefficient 
on the term “ERS x Medium PCGDP” is significant in Columns 4 and 5. In Column 5, the 
coefficient on “ERS x High PCGDP” is also significant, and both “ERS x Medium PCGDP” and 
“ERS x High PCGDP” are greater than “ERS x Low PCGDP” in the estimates’ magnitude 
although they are not statistically significantly different. At least, we can surmise that for 
countries with underdeveloped financial markets, higher levels of exchange rate stability do not 
lead to higher output volatility. Those with medium levels of financial development do seem to 
experience higher output volatility when they pursue a more stable exchange rate, suggesting that 
countries with newly developed financial markets can be volatile when they pursue greater 
exchange rate stability. Furthermore, in both Columns 4 and 5, the estimated coefficients on the 
interaction term between ERS and IR are found to be significantly negative. Using the estimates, 
we can estimate that to cancel or lessen the volatility-enhancing effect of ERS, EMGs with 
medium (or higher) levels of financial development need to hold at least 22-25% of GDP of 
international reserves. However, this rule is not applicable to those with underdeveloped 
financial markets.  
Financial development and financial openness seem to have interesting interactive effects 
on output volatility as well. While those EMGs with medium or higher levels of financial 
development tend to experience less output volatility when they decide to pursue more stable 
exchange rates, those with underdeveloped financial markets are expected to experience greater 
output volatility if they pursue greater financial openness. When the coefficient of “KAOPEN x   28
Medium PCGDP” and “KAOPEN x High PCGDP” are compared to that of “KAOPEN x Low 
PCGDP,” the difference is found to be statistically significant. These results indicate that 
emerging market economies need to be equipped with highly developed financial markets if they 
want to reap the benefit of financial liberalization on their output volatility.  
These findings suggest that a policy management leaning more toward exchange rate 
stability is most likely to exacerbate output volatility when the economy is equipped with 
medium levels of financial development. Having a higher level of financial openness and 
financial development can yield a synergistic impact to dampen output volatility, presumably by 
facilitating allocation of capital, ameliorating information asymmetry, and thereby reducing the 
cost of capital.
48 The worst and more significant case is that a country with underdeveloped 
financial markets can exacerbate output volatility caused by financial liberalization.  
 
4.2 The Effects of External Financing 
Financial liberalization has increased its pace over the last two decades. This, however, 
does not mean that countries suddenly became more financially linked with others. In the 1980s, 
developing countries received external financing in the form of sovereign debt, but the debt crisis 
experience spurred many of these countries to shy away from sovereign debt. After the 1990s, 
the role of FDI became more important and more recent waves of financial liberalization have 
contributed to a rise in portfolio flows across borders as well. As Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) 
note, the type, volume, and direction of capital flows have changed over time. 
 
4.2.1 Incorporation of External Financing 
Against this backdrop, we extend our investigation by incorporating the effect of external 
financing. More specifically, we include the variables that capture net FDI inflows, net portfolio 
inflows, net ‘other’ inflows (which mostly include bank lending in IFS), short-term debt, and 
total debt service. For net capital flows, we use the IFS data and define them as external 
liabilities (= capital inflows with a positive sign) minus assets (= capital inflows with a negative 
sign) for each type of flows – negative values mean that a country experiences a net outflow 
capital of the type of concern. Short-term debt is included as the ratio of total external debt and 
total debt service as is that of Gross National Income (GNI). Both variables are retrieved from 
WDI. Because the debt-related variables are limited, we only deal with one subsample that is 
composed of developing countries for which the debt-related variables are available. Also, to 
                                                 
48 See Bekaert et al., (2000, 2001), Henry (2000), Stultz (1999) among others for the link between financial 
liberalization and the cost of capital. Chinn and Ito (2006) show that financial openness can exogenously lead to 
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isolate the effect of external financing from currency crises, we include a dummy for currency 
crises. 
  The results are reported in Table 9 for all three dependent variables, output volatility in 
columns 1 through 3, inflation volatility in columns 4 through 6, and inflation level in columns 7 
through 9. We present the estimated coefficients only for the variables of interest.
49 Table 9 
shows that the more ‘other’ capital inflows, i.e., banking lending or more net portfolio inflows, a 
country receives, the more likely it is to experience higher output volatility, reflecting the fact 
that countries that experience macroeconomic turmoil often experience an increase in inflows of 
banking lending or “hot money” such as portfolio investment. FDI inflows appear to contribute 
to lowering inflation volatility, which is somewhat counterintuitive. One possible explanation is 
that countries tend to stabilize inflation movement to attract FDI, and this may also explain the 
negative, but less significant, coefficients on the net FDI inflow variables in the inflation level 
regressions. Other types of capital flows do not seem to matter for either inflation volatility or 
inflation levels.  
Both short-term debt and total debt service are positive and significant contributors to 
both inflation volatility and inflation level, supporting our previous argument that countries do 
tend to monetize their debt especially when their monetary authorities embrace more 
independence – the estimated coefficient on monetary independence continues to be significantly 
positive in the inflation level regressions.  
Among the trilemma indexes, greater monetary independence continues to be a negative 
contributor to output volatility though it is also a positive contributor to the level of inflation. 
More financial openness is now a negative contributor to output volatility for this sample of 
countries while its negative impact on the level of inflation remains. Higher exchange rate 
stability continues to dampen the level of inflation, but holding too much of international 
reserves (more than 45% of GDP) can cancel the negative effect and contribute to higher 
inflation.  
 
4.2.2 External Financing and Policy Orientation 
Given that the combination of two out of three policy stances is what matters to the 
macro outcomes, when we estimate the effect of external financing, it is important to condition 
on what kind of policy combination is being pursued by the recipient countries.
50 The best way 
for us to do that is to examine the interactive effect between the type of external financing and 
that of the policy combination. For that purpose, we create dummy variables for the types of 
                                                 
49 Overall, other macroeconomic variables retain the characteristics found in the previous regressions, though they 
tend to be less statistically significant. 
50 See IMF (2007) for an examination of the relationship between how countries manage capital inflows and 
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policy orientation using the composite trilemma indexes we have been using. That is, if the 
composite index MI_ERS turns out to be the highest compared to the other two, MI_KAO and 
ERS_KAO, then a value of one is assigned for D_MI_ERS and zero for the other two, 
D_MI_KAO and D_ERS_KAO. In the results shown in Table 10, the external financing 
variables are interacted with the dummy for one particular type of policy combination. For 
example, in columns 1 and 2 of Table 10 we use in the estimation of output volatility the dummy 
for the policy orientation of greater monetary independence and exchange rate stability (MI_ERS; 
or “financially closed” policy option) and interact it with the external financing variables. 
Columns 3 and 4 use the dummy for the policy orientation of greater monetary independence and 
further financial opening (“more flexible exchange rate” policy), and columns 5 and 6 use that of 
greater exchange rate stability and further financial opening (“currency union” or currency 
board). The following six columns report the results for the estimation of inflation volatility and 
the next six for the level of inflation.  
For output volatility, we find different types of external financing can have different 
impacts on output volatility depending on the policy regime in place. Net FDI inflows, for 
example, tend to dampen output volatility in general, but it can enhance the volatility in a regime 
that has pursued greater monetary independence and more stable exchange rates (i.e., less 
financial openness). Net portfolio inflows seem to have a positive impact on output volatility, but 
its volatility increasing impact is especially higher for the countries with the ERS-KAO 
(“currency union”) regimes, in line with what has been found in the crisis literature. Countries 
with more flexible exchange rates (or monetary independence and financial openness), on the 
other hand, may be able to dampen the volatility-increasing effect, though its effect for this 
policy orientation is not found to be statistically significant. Positive net inflows of bank lending 
can be volatility increasing, but that effect can be dampened, though only marginally 
significantly, if the country adopts the policy combination of exchange rate stability and financial 
openness.  
The greater the debt service is, the more likely a country is to experience higher levels of 
output volatility, especially when the country pursues a combination of greater exchange rate 
stability and financial openness. This result appears to be consistent with the “original sin” 
argument; countries that are indebted in a foreign currency and that try to maintain both 
exchange rate stability and capital account openness often experience sudden capital flow 
reversal and consequently higher output volatility. 
In the inflation volatility regressions, it seems that net inflow of FDI contributes to lower 
inflation volatility across different policy regimes in general. However, the volatility-reducing 
effect is even higher for countries with flexible exchange rates. The table also shows that, for 
countries with flexible exchange systems, portfolio inflows can lower inflation volatility. These   31
results imply that if a country is considering to allow more influx of FDI or portfolio flows while 
wanting to lower inflation volatility, it would be best to adopt a flexible exchange rate system or 
keep the overall level of financial openness at low levels. Lastly, total debt services can make 
countries with monetary independence and financial openness experience higher inflation 
volatility while financially closed regimes would experience a slight drop in inflation volatility. 
This may be because rapid currency depreciation could enlarge the size of total debt which could 
encourage countries to monetize away the debt.  
Different types of policy combinations seem to matter only for ‘other’ (i.e., bank lending) 
inflows in the estimation for the level of inflation; a net recipient of bank lending flows tends to 
experience lower inflation if it adopts a policy combination of monetary independence and 
financial openness, but it could experience higher inflation if it adopts a financially closed 
system. One merit of a country with currency union-like regime is that it can dampen the 
inflation pressure of total debt services. A country with closed financial markets on the other 
hand may experience higher output volatility as a result of higher levels of debt services. 
 
5.  Implications for the Current Crisis 
5.1   International Reserve Holdings: Is the Trilemma Still Binding? 
It has been argued that one of the main causes of the financial crisis of 2008-09 is the 
ample liquidity provided by the global imbalances; current account surplus countries hoard 
international reserves in an attempt to stabilize their exchange rates, export liquidity to the global 
markets, and finance profligacy in the advanced countries, especially the United States.
51 In 
Figure 8, we have seen that some, but not many, countries pursue higher levels of ERS and IR 
concurrently. Figure 9 updates Figure 8 by using the updated Trilemma indexes and IR data for 
2007 and compare with the data from the 2002-06 period. In the panels of figures, we can 
observe that countries’ positions do not change much. The only noticeable change would be that 
countries continue to increase their IR holding, but they are not necessarily moving toward the 
northeast corner. Why do these countries continue to increase their IR holding? 
One possible conjecture is that countries holding a massive amount of foreign reserves 
might allow the relaxation of the trilemma, i.e., achieve all three goals at the same time. Figure 
10 displays a scatter diagram for EMG countries’ ERS and MI_KAO (composite index of MI 
and KAOPEN), which the concept of the trilemma predicts should be negatively correlated. 
There are two groups of country-years shown in the diagram; one is a group of country-years 
with the IR holding greater than 21% of GDP, the threshold above which ERS can have output 
volatility-reducing effect as shown in Figures 8 and 9, and the other is those with the IR holding 
less than 21% of GDP. If the above speculation is right, the (green) triangles – country-years 
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with >21% IR – in the diagram should be scattered above the circles – country-years with <21% 
IR.  
Theoretically, these two variables should be negatively correlated – the higher level of 
ERS a country pursues, the lower level of MI-KAO, which is a proxy to the weighted average of 
MI and KAO it has to choose as we formally confirmed in Section 2.4. In the figure, however, 
the fitted lines for both groups are barely negatively sloped – the estimated coefficients for both 
are statistically insignificantly negative. We test whether the slopes and intercepts of these two 
fitted lines are statistically different. If the conjecture that higher levels of IR holding could relax 
the trilemma, a country should be able to pursue higher levels of MI-KAO with the same level of 
ERS, which would either make the slope flatter or raise the intercept, i.e., the conditional mean 
of MI-KAO. Simple coefficient equality tests reveal that the slopes of the two fitted lines are not 
statistically different from each other, but that the intercept for the fitted line for the country-
years with >21% IR is significantly higher than that for the <21% IR group. This is in line with 
the conjecture that higher levels of IR holding can allow a country to pursue a higher weighted 
average of MI and KAOPEN, i.e., relax the trilemma. 
Given the findings from the output volatility regressions in Table 4, for the EMG 
countries, having greater monetary independence could lead a country to reduce output volatility. 
If a country holds a higher level of IR than 21% of its GDP, it may be able to relax the trilemma, 
so that it may decide to pursue greater monetary independence and financial openness while 
maintaining exchange rate stability. One easy candidate that fits this category is China. Figure 11 
shows the trilemma configurations and IR holding for emerging market countries in East Asia 
and China. We can observe that while it does not give up its exchange rate stability and monetary 
independence, China’s IR holding has been increasing and financial openness has inched up. 
Although we have not tested formally, we find evidence consistent with the view that countries’ 
efforts to “relax the trilemma” can involve an increase in IR holding, which may have 
contributed to the global expansion of liquidity prior to the financial crisis of 2008-09. We leave 
testing this argument as one of our future research agendas. 
 
5.2 Is the Current Crisis Consistent with Our Models? 
  As the IMF has revised the GDP estimates downward for many developing countries 
several times since the fall of 2008, it has become clear that the ongoing crisis is not just an 
American problem or the one in the industrial world, but a major challenge for the global 
economy. In other words, the concept of “de-coupling” is no longer applicable.  
  Given that we can identify the countries that are experiencing more severe economic 
situations than others as the time of this writing, we examine whether the current crisis situations 
are consistent with what we have found from our previous findings. That is, we use the data from   33
2007 for the variables upon which we have focused in this paper and see whether the conditions 
of these variables as of the eve of the crisis present any signals for the ongoing crisis. For this 
purpose, Table 11 presents the variables of our focus for a group of emerging market countries. 
Namely, the table reports PCGDP, IR (both as% of GDP), the three trilemma indexes, and the 
external finance variables. dX refers to the change of the variable X compared to the 2002-06 
period.
52 In the table, we also report swap lines provided by the U.S. Federal Reserve and rescue 
loans provided by the IMF (as of March 2009). The swap lines and rescue loans are reported to 
identify which countries are experiencing more severe situations than others although countries 
without these arrangements can be also experiencing dire situations.  
  Before making observations of these countries, it is noteworthy to point out that the size 
of the swap lines or the IMF rescue loans is not so big for most of the countries. For Brazil, 
Mexico, and Korea, it is about 2-3% of GDP and 7% for Pakistan. It is only for Singapore and 
Hungary that the size of the additionally available IR is relatively substantial, around 18% of 
GDP. Based on what we found in Figures 8 and 9, we can see that, except for Singapore and 
Hungary, the effect of these swap lines or IMF rescue loans can be quite minimal at most to 
reduce output volatility. Obstfeld et al. (2009) also mention the smallness of the additional IR 
provided for developing countries, especially compared to industrialized countries, and argue 
that these additional reserves would merely have signaling effects, unlike industrial countries’ 
that can have real effects to relax liquidity constraints.
53 Our results are consistent with their 
observation. 
Let us now make observations about the conditions pertaining to trilemma configurations 
and both internal and external financing of the concerned countries. Among the countries with 
the swap or rescue loan arrangements, Hungary, Korea, and Pakistan experienced a relatively 
rapid increase in net inflows of bank lending (‘Other’). In Table 9, we see that countries with 
positive net inflow of ‘other’ investment tend to experience higher output volatility. Among the 
three countries, Hungary appears to have pursued the combination of MI and KAOPEN whereas 
Pakistan did that of MI and ERS. Both combinations, MI-KAO or MI-ERS, are found to lead 
bank lending flows to have a bigger impact on output volatility (Table 10). The Pakistani 
economy is also subject to higher output volatility because its financial development level is not 
high although it pursues greater exchange rate stability. Interestingly, several other East 
European countries, such as Lithuania, Poland, and Slovak Republic, and Russia also 
experienced large increases in net inflow of bank lending, which suggest that these economies 
                                                 
52 PCGDP is as of 2006 (or 2005 if the figure for 2006 is unavailable) because it is unavailable for 2007.  
53 They also argue that the fact that a more substantial amount of rescue reserves can be readily available for 
industrialized countries should be the reason why industrialized countries do not (have to) hold a massive amount of 
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can be subject to higher output volatility.
54 In Table 9, we also found that the higher level of net 
inflow of portfolio investment it receives, the greater output volatility a country would have to 
face. The impact can be greater especially when the country pursues a policy combination of 
ERS and KAO. Both Brazil and Argentina experienced a rapid increase in net inflow of portfolio 
investment although neither of them pursued the policy combination of ERS and KAO. The table 
also shows that Venezuela may be exposed to higher output volatility; it pursued fixed exchange 
rate though its IR fell significantly while portfolio inflow increased. Thus, our casual 
observations confirm that the inferences we obtained from our estimations seem to be consistent 
with the economic conditions that led to severe crisis situations. 
 
6. Concluding  Remarks 
  Our paper outlined a methodology to trace the changing patterns of the trilemma 
configurations. Taking a longer-run view, it reveals striking differences between the choices of 
industrialized and developing countries during 1970-2006. The recent trend suggests that among 
emerging market countries, the three dimensions of the trilemma configurations: monetary 
independence, exchange rate stability, and financial openness, are converging towards a “middle 
ground” with managed exchange rate flexibility, which they attempted to buffer by holding 
sizable international reserves, while maintaining medium levels of monetary independence and 
financial integration. Industrialized countries, on the other hand, have been experiencing 
divergence of the three dimensions of the trilemma and moved toward the configuration of high 
exchange rate stability and financial openness and low monetary independence as most 
distinctively exemplified by the euro countries’ experience. 
This configuration of the three macroeconomic policies is an outcome of the evolution of 
different system arrangements. Over years, external shocks have affected the policy arrangement 
across countries. In this regard, we have shown that major crises in the last four decades, namely, 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the debt crisis of 1982, and the Asian crisis of 1997-
98, caused structural breaks in the trilemma configurations. For both industrialized and 
developing countries, the major events in the last decade, such as the emergence of rapid 
globalization and the rise of China, have also impacted the policy arrangements significantly. 
With these results, we can safely expect that the present turbulence in the global financial 
markets could challenge the stability of the current trilemma configuration.  
We also tested whether the three macroeconomic policy goals are “binding” in the 
context of the impossible trinity. That is, we attempted to provide evidence that countries have 
faced the trade-offs based on the trilemma. Because there is no specific functional form of the 
                                                 
54 Latvia, though not categorized as an EMG country in the dataset, also experienced an influx of bank lending in 
this year and is experiencing a severe economic crisis in 2008-09.   35
trade-offs or the linkage of these three policy goals, we tested a simplest linear specification for 
the three trilemma indexes and examined whether the weighted sum of the three trilemma policy 
variables adds up to a constant. Our results confirmed that countries do face the binding trilemma. 
That is, a change in one of the trilemma variables would induce a change with the opposite sign 
in the weighted average of the other two.  
While external forces could impact countries’ decisions on the trilemma configurations, 
policy makers decide on the specifics of the combination of the three policies depending on the 
goals they would like to achieve. Hence, we also tested how each one of the three policy choices 
as well as the combination of the two could affect the economic outcomes policy makers pay 
close attention to, such as output volatility, inflation volatility, and medium-term inflation rates, 
with a particular focus on developing countries. 
We found countries with higher levels of monetary independence tend to experience 
lower output volatility. When we restrict our sample to emerging market economies, we also 
found that countries with higher levels of exchange rate fixity tend to experience higher output 
volatility. However, this effect can be mitigated by holding international reserves if the level of 
international reserves is higher than 19-22% of GDP. This result motivates the reason why so 
many emerging market countries want to hold massive amounts of international reserves. 
We also found that countries with more monetary autonomy tend to experience higher 
inflation, which may reflect countries’ motives to monetize their debt. Countries with higher 
exchange rate stability tend to experience lower inflation as has been found in the literature. 
Furthermore, financial openness helps a country to experience lower inflation, possibly 
indicating that globalization gives more discipline than monetary autonomy to a country’s 
macroeconomic management. 
We also extended our estimation model to investigate the following two questions 
relevant to the current crisis: 1) Can financial development affect the link between trilemma 
policy configurations and output volatility?; and 2) How can external financing affect 
macroeconomic performances interactively with the trilemma configurations?  
Regarding the effect of financial development on the link between the trilemma 
configurations and output volatility, we found a nonlinear effect among emerging market 
economies that medium-levels of financial development can raise the volatility-enhancing impact 
of exchange rate stability. Highly developed financial markets can help financial liberalization 
policy to reduce output volatility while underdeveloped financial markets could exacerbate 
output volatility, signifying the synergistic effects between financial development and financial 
opening. 
In the estimations with the variables for external financing, we find the following: net 
recipients of cross-border bank lending or portfolio flows – or the “hot money” – tend to   36
experience higher output volatility, a result consistent with the literature. We also took a closer 
look at the effect of policy orientations on the effect of external financing and found that the 
effect of different types of external financing can depend upon the policy regime adopted by a 
country. First, net FDI inflows tend to dampen output volatility in general, but it can increase the 
volatility in a “financially closed” regime, i.e., one with greater monetary independence and 
more stable exchange rates. Net portfolio inflows can be volatility-increasing, and its effect is 
greater for the countries with currency union or alike regimes. This type of regimes, however, 
can dampen the volatility-enhancing effect of bank lending. Among the variables related to 
sovereignty debt, the greater the debt service is, the more likely a country could experience 
higher levels of output volatility, especially when combined with greater exchange rate stability 
and financial openness, a result consistent with the “original sin” literature. 
Our results also help answer why many countries have been hoarding massive amount of 
IR, which has been claimed to be one of the causes of the current global financial crisis. A 
motive for countries to hold massive IR is its desire to relax the trilemma; voluminous IR 
holding allows countries to pursue both a higher level of exchange rate stability and a higher 
weighted average of the other two trilemma policies through active foreign exchange 
interventions. Given our finding that holding a higher level of IR than 21-24% of GDP can 
dampen or even reverse the volatility-increasing effect of exchange rate stability, this finding is 
plausible. 
Lastly, our empirical findings are consistent with the conditions of the countries that are 
currently experiencing macroeconomic turmoil; countries in turmoil do seem to be the ones with 
the trilemma variables and those related to both internal and external financing at the levels that 
lead to higher output volatility. In other words, our model could predict higher output volatility 
for countries experiencing or at the brink of financial crises. This bolsters the validity of our 
empirical analyses. 
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      (172)  (181)  (178) 
1  512  Afghanistan (C)  U.S.  -  -  1961  2005  1970  2004 
2 914 Albania  (C)  U.S.  1992  2006 1993 2006 1996 2006 
3  612  Algeria (C)  France  1974  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
4 614 Angola  (C)  U.S.  1995  2006 1961 2006 1993 2006 
5  311  Antigua and Barbuda  U.S.  1981  2006  1961  2006  1985  2006 
6 213 Argentina  (E)  (C)  U.S.  1977  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
7  911  Armenia  U.S.  1995  2006  1993  2006  1996  2006 
8 314 Aruba  U.S.  1986  2006 1987 2006 1992 2006 
9  193  Australia  U.S.  1969  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
10 122 Austria  Germany  1960  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
11  912  Azerbaijan  U.S.  1993  2006  1993  2006  2000  2006 
12 313 Bahamas,  The  U.S.  1970  2006 1961 2006 1977 2006 
13  419  Bahrain (C)  U.S.  1975  2006  1967  2006  1976  2006 
14 513 Bangladesh  (E)  U.S.  1972  2006 1972 2006 1976 2006 
15  316  Barbados  1960-74 U.K.; 1975-U.S.  1967  2006  1961  2006  1974  2006 
16 913 Belarus  U.S.  1993  2006 1993 2006 1996 2006 
17  124  Belgium  Germany  1960  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
18 339 Belize  U.S.  1979  2006 1961 2006 1985 2006 
19  638  Benin  France  1964  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
20 514 Bhutan  Rupee  1982  2006 1961 2006 1985 2006 
21  218  Bolivia (C)  U.S.  1960  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
22 616 Botswana  (E)  (C)  South  Africa  1976  2006 1961 2006 1972 2006 
23  223  Brazil (E)  U.S.  1964  2006  1965  2006  1970  2006 
24 918 Bulgaria  (E)  Germany  1991  2006 1961 2006 1996 2006 
25  748  Burkina Faso  France  1964  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
26 618 Burundi  (C)  1960-70  Belgium;  1971-U.S.  1977  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
27  662  Cote d’Ivoire (E) (C)  France  1964  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
28 522 Cambodia  U.S.  1994  2006 1961 2006 1973 2006 
29  622  Cameroon  France  1968  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
30 156 Canada  U.S.  1960  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
31  624  Cape Verde  Germany  1985  2006  1961  2006  1982  2006 
32 626 Central  African  Rep.  France  1968  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
33  628  Chad (C)  France  1968  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
34 228 Chile  (E)  (C)  U.S.  1977  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
35  924  China (E)  U.S.  1980  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
36 233 Colombia  (E)  U.S.  1964  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
37  632  Comoros  France  1983  2006  1961  2006  1981  2006 
38 636 Congo,  Dem.  Rep.  (C)  U.S.  1982  2003 1961 2006 1970 2000 
39  634  Congo, Rep. (C)  France  1968  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
40 238 Costa  Rica  U.S.  1964  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
41  960  Croatia  Germany  1992  2006  1993  2006  1998  2006 
42 423 Cyprus  Germany  1969  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
43  935  Czech Republic (E)  Germany  1993  2006  1994  2006  1998  2006 
44 128 Denmark  Germany  1960  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
45  611  Djibouti  U.S.  1996  2006  1961  2006  1982  2006 
46 321 Dominica  U.S.  1981  2006 1961 2006 1982 2006 
47  243  Dominican Republic  U.S.  1995  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
48 248 Ecuador  (E)  U.S.  1970  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
49  469  Egypt, Arab Rep. (E)  U.S.  1964  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
50 253 El  Salvador  U.S.  1983  2005 1961 2006 1970 2006 
51  642  Equatorial Guinea (C)  France  1985  2006  1961  2006  1973  2006 
52 643 Eritrea  U.S.  -  -  1961 2006 1998 2006 
53  939  Estonia  Germany  1993  2006  1993  2006  1998  2006 
54 644 Ethiopia  (C)  U.S.  1985  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
55  819  Fiji  U.S.  1974  2006  1961  2006  1975  2006 
56 172 Finland  Germany  1960  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
57  132  France  Germany  1964  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
58 646 Gabon  (C)  France  1968  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
59  648  Gambia, The  U.K.  1977  2006  1961  2006  1971  2006 
60 915 Georgia  U.S.  1995  2006 1996 2006 1998 2006 
61  134  Germany  U.S.  1960  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
62 652 Ghana  (E)  (C)  U.S.  1964  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
63  174  Greece  1960-80 U.S.; 1981-Germany  1960  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 











65  258  Guatemala (C)  U.S.  1960  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
66 656 Guinea  (C)  1960-73  France;  1974-U.S.  1986  2006 1961 2005 1970 2006 
67  654  Guinea-Bissau (C)  U.S.  1975  2006  1961  2006  1981  2006 
68 336 Guyana  (C)  1960-75  U.K.;  1976-U.S.  1966  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
69  263  Haiti  U.S.  1994  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
70 268 Honduras  (C)  U.S.  1979  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
71  532  Hong Kong, China (E)  U.S.  1982  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
72 944 Hungary  (E)  1960-91  U.S.;  1992-Germany  1971  2006 1969 2006 1998 2006 
73  176  Iceland (C)  1960-90 U.S.; 1991-Germany  1964  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
74 534 India  (E)  1960-79  U.K.;  1980-U.S.  1964  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
75  536  Indonesia (E)  U.S.  1983  2006  1968  2006  1970  2006 
76 429 Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  (C)  U.S.  1960  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
77  433  Iraq (C)  U.S.  -  -  1961  2006  1970  2006 
78 178 Ireland  1960-78  U.K.;  1979-Germany  1964  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
79  436  Israel (E)  U.S.  1982  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
80 136 Italy  Germany  1964  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
81  343  Jamaica (E)  U.S.  1961  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
82 158 Japan  U.S.  1960  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
83  439  Jordan (E)  U.S.  1966  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
84 916 Kazakhstan  U.S.  1994  2006 1994 2006 1998 2006 
85  664  Kenya (E)  U.S.  1967  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
86 826 Kiribati  Australia  -  -  1961 2006 1990 2005 
87  542  Korea, Rep. (E)  U.S.  1964  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
88 443 Kuwait  U.S.  1975  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
89  917  Kyrgyz Republic  U.S.  1993  2006  1994  2006  1998  2006 
90 544 Lao  PDR  U.S.  1979  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
91  941  Latvia  Germany  1993  2006  1993  2006  1998  2006 
92 446 Lebanon  U.S.  1964  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
93  666  Lesotho  South Africa  1980  2006  1961  2006  1972  2006 
94 668 Liberia  (C)  U.S.  1981  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
95  672  Libya (C)  U.S.  1963  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
96 946 Lithuania  (E)  Germany  1994  2006 1993 2006 1998 2006 
97  137  Luxembourg  1960-78 Belgium; 1979- Germany  1985  2006  1961  2006    - 
98 674 Madagascar  (C)  France  1970  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
99  676  Malawi (C)  U.S.  1963  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
100 548 Malaysia  (E)  U.S.  1966  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
101  556  Maldives  U.S.  1978  2006  1961  2006  1982  2006 
102 678 Mali  (C)  France  1964  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
103  181  Malta  France  1969  2006  1961  2006  1972  2006 
104 682 Mauritania  (C)  1960-73  France;  1974-U.S.  1964  2006 1961 2005 1970 1964 
105  684  Mauritius (E)  U.K.  1967  2006  1961  2006  1972  1967 
106 273 Mexico  (E)  U.S.  1976  2006 1961 2006 1970 1976 
107  868  Micronesia, Fed. Sts.  U.S.  1996  2006  1961  2006  1996  1996 
108 921 Moldova  U.S.  1995  2006 1992 2006 1998 1995 
109  948  Mongolia (C)  U.S.  1993  2006  1991  2006  1998  1993 
110 686 Morocco  (E)  France  1969  2006 1961 2006 1970 1969 
111  688  Mozambique  U.S.  1994  2006  1961  2006  1988  1994 
112 518 Myanmar  (C)  U.S.  1975  2006 1961 2006 1970 1975 
113  728  Namibia (C)  South Africa  1991  2006  1962  2006  1994  1991 
114 558 Nepal  1960-82  U.S.;  1983-India  1974  2006 1961 2006 1970 1974 
115  138  Netherlands  Germany  1960  2006  1961  2006  1970  1960 
116 353 Netherlands  Antilles  U.S.  1980  2006 1961 2006 1970 1980 
117  196  New Zealand (C)  Australia  1969  2006  1961  2006  1970  1969 
118 278 Nicaragua  (C)  U.S.  1990  2006 1961 2006 1970 1990 
119  692  Niger (C)  France  1964  2006  1961  2006  1970  1964 
120 694 Nigeria  (E)  (C)  U.S.  1964  2005 1961 2006 1970 1964 
121  142  Norway  Germany  1964  2006  1961  2006  1970  1964 
122 449 Oman  (C)  U.S.  1980  2006 1961 2006 1977 1980 
123  564  Pakistan (E)  U.S.  1964  2006  1961  2006  1970  1964 
124 283 Panama  U.S.  1986  2006 1961 2006 1970 1986 
125  853  Papua New Guinea (C)  1960-85 Australia; 1986-U.S.  1974  2006  1961  2006  1979  1974 
126 288 Paraguay  (C)  U.S.  1990  2006 1961 2006 1970 1990 
127  293  Peru (E) (C)  U.S.  1960  2006  1961  2006  1970  1960 
128 566 Philippines  (E)  U.S.  1964  2006 1961 2006 1970 1964 
129  964  Poland (E)  Germany  1991  2006  1961  2006  1990  1991 
130 182 Portugal  Germany  1960  2006 1961 2006 1970 1960 
131  453  Qatar (C)  U.S.  1980  2006  1967  2006  1976  1980 











133  922  Russian Federation (E)  U.S.  1995  2006  1993  2006  1998  2006 
134 714 Rwanda  (C)  1960-73  Belgium;  1974-U.S.  1966  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
135  716  Sao Tome & Principe (C)  U.S.  1989  2006  1961  2006  1981  2006 
136 862 Samoa  Australia  1983  2006 1961 2006 1975 2006 
137  135  San Marino  Germany  -  -  1961  2006  1996  2006 
138 456 Saudi  Arabia  (C)  U.S.  1997  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
139  722  Senegal  France  1964  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
140 718 Seychelles  U.S.  1979  2006 1961 2006 1981 2006 
141  724  Sierra Leone  1960-77 U.K.; 1978-U.S.  1966  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
142 576 Singapore  (E)  Malaysia  1972  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
143  936  Slovak Republic (E)  Germany  1993  2006  1994  2006  1998  2006 
144 961 Slovenia  (E)  Germany  1993  2006 1992 2006 1998 2006 
145  813  Solomon Islands (C)  1960-85 Australia; 1986-U.S.  1981  2006  1961  2006  1982  2006 
146 726 Somalia  (C)  U.S.  -  -  1961 1989 1970 2006 
147  199  South Africa (E)  U.S.  1960  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
148 184 Spain  Germany  1964  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
149  524  Sri Lanka (E)  1960-92 U.S.; 1993-India  1964  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
150 361 St.  Kitts  and  Nevis  U.S.  1981  2006 1961 2006 1988 2006 
151  362  St. Lucia  U.S.  1981  2006  1961  2006  1983  2006 
152  364  St. Vinc. & the Gren. (C)  U.S.  1981  2006  1961  2006  1983  2006 
153  732  Sudan (C)  1960-71 U.K.; 1972-U.S.  1978  1984  1961  2006  1970  2005 
154 366 Suriname  (C)  U.S.  1991  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
155  734  Swaziland (C)  South Africa  1974  2006  1961  2006  1973  2006 
156 144 Sweden  Germany  1960  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
157  146  Switzerland  Germany  1964  2006  1961  2006  1996  2006 
158 463 Syrian  Arab  Republic  U.S.  2003  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
159  528  Taiwan (E)  U.S.  1985  2006  1983  2006  -  - 
160 923 Tajikistan  U.S.  1997  2006 1993 2006 1998 2006 
161  738  Tanzania (C)  U.S.  1973  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
162 578 Thailand  (E)  U.S.  1977  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
163  742  Togo (C)  France  1964  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
164 866 Tonga  Australia  1981  2006 1961 2006 1989 2006 
165  369  Trinidad & Tobago (E) (C)  1960-75 U.K.; 1976-U.S.  1965  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
166 744 Tunisia  (E)  France  1964  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
167  186  Turkey (E)  U.S.  1964  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
168 925 Turkmenistan  (C)  U.S.  -  -  1994 2001 1998 2006 
169  746  Uganda (C)  U.S.  1980  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
170 926 Ukraine  U.S.  1992  2006 1993 2006 1998 2006 
171  466  United Arab Emirates (C)  U.S.  -  -  1967  2006  1976  2006 
172 112 United  Kingdom  Germany  1960  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
173  298  Uruguay  U.S.  1976  2006  1965  2006  1970  2006 
174 846 Vanuatu  U.S.  1981  2006 1961 2006 1985 2000 
175  299  Venezuela, RB (E) (C)  1960-89 France; 1990-U.S.  1964  2006  1961  2006  1970  2006 
176 582 Vietnam  (C)  U.S.  1996  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
177  474  Yemen, Rep.  U.S.  1996  2006  1991  2006  1995  2006 
178 754 Zambia  (C)  U.S.  1965  2006 1961 2006 1970 2006 
179  698  Zimbabwe (E) (C)  U.S.  1965  2005  1961  2005  1984  2006 
               
Notes: The base countries are primarily based on Shambaugh (QJE) and complemented by information from 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangement and Exchange Restrictions and CIA Factbook
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Table 1: Mean-Equality Tests of the Trilemma Indexes between Emerging Market 
Countries (EMG) and Non-Emerging Market Developing Countries (Non-EMG LDC) 
 
    1971 – 1980  1981 – 1990  1991 – 2000  2001-2006 
Non-EMG LDC  .4495  .4510  .4748  .4427 
EMG .4784  .4772  .4941  .3847 
Difference .02883  .0262  .0193  -.0579 
Monetary 
Independence (MI) 
t-statistics 2.86***  2.71***  2.07**  4.31*** 
Non-EMG LDC  .7941  .7228  .6508  .7266 
EMG .6703  .4983  .4901  .5364 
Difference -.1238  -.2245  -.1607  -.1902 
Exchange Rate 
Stability (ERS) 
t-statistics  6.70*** 11.04*** 8.47*** 8.68*** 
Non-EMG LDC  .3511  .3138  .3785  .4177 
EMG .2803  .2522  .4014  .5498 




t-statistics 3.42***  3.08***  1.19
12% 5.09*** 
Non-EMG LDC  .1013  .1093  .1331  .1772 
EMG .1109  .1104  .1697  .2322 
Difference .0095  .0011  .0366  .0550 
International 
Reserves Holding 
(% of GDP; IR) 
t-statistics 1.31*  0.12  4.25***  4.67*** 
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Table 2 (a): Tests for Structural Breaks in the Trilemma Indexes 
 
  1970-72 1974-81  1983-96  1999-2006 
Mean 0.376 0.407  0.389  0.139 
Change  +0.031  -0.018 -0.250  Monetary Independence 
t-stats (p-value)    1.31 (0.11)  0.85 (0.20)  11.91 (0.00)*** 
Mean 0.688 0.429  0.476  0.702 
Change   -0.259  +0.047  +0.226  Exchange Rate Stability 
t-stats (p-value)    6.64 (0.00)***  2.41 (0.01)**  12.45 (0.00)*** 
Mean 0.439 0.469  0.688  0.955 




t-stats (p-value)    1.62 (0.07)*  4.34 (0.00)***  5.27 (0.00)*** 
  1970-72 1974-81  1983-96  1999-2006 
Mean 0.500 0.399  0.457  0.534 
Change   -0.101  +0.058  +0.077  Monetary Independence 
t-stats (p-value)    1.68 (0.06)*  1.84 (0.04)**  3.55 (0.00)*** 
Mean 0.786 0.780  0.635  0.742 
Change   -0.006  -0.145  +0.107  Exchange Rate Stability 
t-stats (p-value)    0.10 (0.46)  5.26 (0.00)***  3.76 (0.00)*** 
Mean 0.267 0.365  0.326  0.391 






t-stats (p-value)    5.73 (0.01)***  2.25 (0.02)**  3.93 (0.00)*** 
  1970-72 1974-81  1983-96  1999-2006 
Mean 0.526 0.474  0.508  0.407 
Change   -0.052  +0.034  -0.100  Monetary Independence 
t-stats (p-value)    2.16 (0.03)**  1.42 (0.09)*  3.81 (0.00)*** 
Mean 0.818 0.715  0.517  0.579 
Change   -0.103  -0.198 +0.63  Exchange Rate Stability 
t-stats (p-value)    3.38 (0.00)***  9.55 (0.00)***  2.71 (0.01)*** 
Mean 0.210 0.229  0.240  0.474 






t-stats (p-value)    5.03 (0.00)***  0.40 (0.35)  8.88 (0.00)*** 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 2(b): Tests for Structural Breaks in the Trilemma Indexes  
 
  1983-89  1991-2006 1983-2000 2002-2006 
Mean  0.396 0.246 0.355 0.126 
Change  -0.150  -0.229  Monetary Independence 
t-stats (p-value)    3.17 (0.00)***    5.82 (0.00)*** 
Mean  0.476 0.599 0.511 0.715 
Change  +0.124  +0.204  Exchange Rate Stability 
t-stat (p-value)    2.64 (0.01)***    5.33 (0.00)*** 
Mean  0.578 0.905 0.748 0.949 




t-stats (p-value)    9.22 (0.00)***    2.62 (0.01)** 
  1983-89  1991-2006 1983-2000 2002-2006 
Mean  0.421 0.522 0.483 0.517 
Change  +0.100  +0.034  Monetary Independence 
t-stats (p-value)    4.80 (0.00)***    1.05 (0.15) 
Mean  0.633 0.699 0.643 0.778 
Change  +0.066  +0.135  Exchange Rate Stability 
t-stats (p-value)    2.01 (0.03)**    4.73 (0.00)*** 
Mean  0.296 0.376 0.336 0.400 






t-stats (p-value)    5.94 (0.00)***    3.20 (0.00)*** 
  1983-89  1991-2006 1983-2000 2002-2006 
Mean  0.471 0.469 0.508 0.385 
Change  -0.002  -0.123  Monetary Independence 
t-stats (p-value)    0.08 (0.47)    4.52 (0.00)*** 
Mean  0.537 0.532 0.515 0.608 
Change  -0.005   +0.093  Exchange Rate Stability 
t-stats (p-value)    0.19 (0.43)    3.95 (0.00)*** 
Mean  0.188 0.403 0.282 0.482 






t-stats (p-value)    6.27 (0.00)***    4.23 (0.00)*** 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   47
Table 2(c): Summary of the Structural Breaks Tests  
 
  Structural Breaks 
Monetary Independence  1997-98 
Exchange Rate Stability  1997-98  




Financial Openness  1990 
   
Monetary Independence  1990 




(NOEMG)  Financial Openness  1990 
   
Monetary Independence  2001 




(EMG)  Financial Openness  1997-98 48 
Table 3: Regression for the Linear Relationship between the Trilemma Indexes:  t t i, t i, t i,   + + = 1 ε + KAOPEN c ERS b MI a j j j  
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
    FULL  1970-72 1974-81 1983-96  1999-2006  1983-89  1991-2006 1983-2000 2002-2006
Monetary Independence  1.084  0.946  1.339  0.99  0.336  1.065  0.558  0.931  0.522 
   [0.039]***  [0.127]*** [0.069]*** [0.057]*** [0.109]***  [0.066]*** [0.077]*** [0.057]*** [0.101]***
Exch. Rate Stability  0.611  0.665  0.597  0.647  0.223  0.613  0.633  0.66  0.448 
   [0.032]***  [0.076]*** [0.090]*** [0.051]*** [0.181]  [0.061]*** [0.100]*** [0.050]*** [0.249]* 
KA Openness  0.437  0.369  0.29  0.448  0.869  0.439  0.632  0.468  0.733 
   [0.021]***  [0.050]*** [0.063]*** [0.031]*** [0.072]***  [0.045]*** [0.042]*** [0.029]*** [0.091]***
ERM x MI  -0.166  –  0.375  -0.287  0.159  -0.43  -0.059  -0.104  -0.022 
   [0.072]**  –  [0.299]  [0.111]*** [0.119]  [0.286]  [0.103]  [0.086]  [0.126] 
ERM x ERS  -0.026  –  0.254  0.073  -0.115  0.218  -0.398  -0.105  -0.338 
   [0.055]  –  [0.165]  [0.073]  [0.183]  [0.104]**  [0.108]*** [0.067]  [0.251] 
ERM x KAOPEN  -0.005  –  -0.273  -0.009  0.039  0.09  0.137  -0.012  0.177 
   [0.052]  –   [0.128]**  [0.054]  [0.075]  [0.122]  [0.059]**  [0.054]  [0.097]* 
LDC x MI  0.148  0.389  -0.175  0.299  0.78  0.214  0.675  0.365  0.567 
   [0.045]***  [0.164]**  [0.097]*  [0.065]*** [0.119]***  [0.078]*** [0.083]*** [0.064]*** [0.120]***
LDC x ERS  -0.193  -0.371  -0.118  -0.21  0.211  -0.134  -0.244  -0.24  0.001 
   [0.035]***  [0.094]*** [0.097]  [0.055]*** [0.184]  [0.067]**  [0.103]**  [0.054]*** [0.252] 
LDC x KAOPEN  -0.158  -0.136  -0.043  -0.176  -0.536  -0.009  -0.362  -0.257  -0.378 
   [0.030]***  [0.079]*  [0.081]  [0.051]*** [0.080]***  [0.069]  [0.052]*** [0.045]*** [0.100]***
Observations  1850  150  400  700  400  350  800  900  250 
Adjusted R-squared  0.95  0.98  0.94  0.96  0.95  0.96  0.96  0.95  0.95 
Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
NOTES: ERM is a dummy for the countries and years that correspond to participation in ERM (i.e., Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, 
and Italy from 1979, Spain from 1989, U.K. only for 1990-91, Portugal from 1992, Austria from 1995, Finland from 1996, and Greece from 1999)  49 
Table 4-1: Output Volatility: Less Developed Countries (LDC), 1972 – 2006, Panels of 5-year Windows  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
-0.032 -0.039 -0.034 -0.022 -0.031 -0.045  -0.029  -0.036  -0.035  -0.037  -0.026  -0.047  Relative Income 
[0.020]  [0.020]* [0.020]*  [0.020]  [0.020] [0.021]** 
Relative Income 
[0.020] [0.020]*  [0.020]*  [0.020]* [0.020]  [0.021]** 
0.05  0.062 0.059 0.034 0.057 0.085  0.046  0.057  0.063 0.07 0.047  0.089  Relative 
Income, sq.  [0.024]** [0.024]** [0.024]**  [0.025]  [0.024]**  [0.026]*** 
Relative Income, 
sq.  [0.024]*  [0.024]** [0.024]***  [0.024]*** [0.024]** [0.025]*** 
0.173 0.171 0.166 0.166 0.168  0.17  0.174  0.173  0.164  0.164  0.171  0.172  Change in US 
real interest rate  [0.045]*** [0.046]*** [0.046]*** [0.046]*** [0.046]*** [0.046]*** 
Change in US 
real interest rate  [0.045]*** [0.045]*** [0.046]*** [0.046]*** [0.046]*** [0.046]*** 
0.037 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.035 0.035  0.036  0.037  0.036  0.036  0.035  0.035  Volatility of 
TOT*OPN  [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** 
Volatility of 
TOT*OPN  [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  Inflation 
volatility  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Inflation 
volatility  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003  Fiscal 
Procyclicality  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]* [0.002]* [0.002]* [0.002]* 
Fiscal 
Procyclicality  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]* [0.002]* [0.002]* [0.002]* 
0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011  0.011  0.012  0.011  0.011 0.01 0.011  Oil Exporters 
[0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Oil Exporters 
[0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
-0.009 -0.009  -0.01  -0.009 -0.009 -0.009  -0.009  -0.008 -0.01 -0.011  -0.009  -0.009  Private credit 
creation  [0.005]*  [0.006]  [0.005]* [0.005]* [0.005]*  [0.006] 
Private credit 
creation  [0.005] [0.005]  [0.005]*  [0.005]*  [0.005]*  [0.006] 
0.018 0.049 0.019 0.021 0.018 0.045  0.018  0.048  0.019  0.025  0.019  0.045  Total 
Reserve/GDP  [0.008]** [0.041] [0.008]** [0.033] [0.009]**  [0.025]* 
Total 
Reserve/GDP  [0.008]** [0.034] [0.008]** [0.031] [0.008]**  [0.024]* 
-0.02  -0.015  -0.019  -0.016      -0.018  -0.009       Monetary 
Independ. (MI)  [0.008]** [0.012] [0.008]** [0.012]     
PC of MI & 
ERS   [0.008]**  [0.012]      
 -0.038  -0.017       -0.068          MI x reserves 
 [0.067]  [0.063]    
MI_ERS x 
reserves    [0.071]      
-0.005  -0.001      -0.003  0.002     -0.02  -0.018     Exchange Rate 
Stability (ERS)  [0.004] [0.005]      [0.004] [0.005] 
PC of MI & 
KAO     [0.009]**  [0.012]    
  -0.029      -0.034        -0.012      ERS x reserves 
  [0.032]      [0.031] 
MI_KAO x 
reserves      [0.058]    
    -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 -0.002          -0.006  0  KA Openness 
    [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] 
PC of ERS. & 
KAO       [0.005]  [0.007] 
    0.015    -0.02            -0.054  KAOPEN x 
reserves      [0.025]    [0.025] 
ERS_KAO x 
reserves        [ 0 . 0 4 1 ]  
# of Obs.  412 412 412 412 412 412  # of Obs.  412 412 412 412 412 412 
Adjusted R2  0.21 0.21 0.22  0.2  0.21 0.22  Adjusted R2  0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22  0.2  0.23 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimated coefficients of the dummies for East 
Asia and Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa are not reported.   50
Table 4-2: Output Volatility: Less Developed, Commodity Exporting Countries (LDC-CMD), 1972 – 2006, Panels of 5-year Windows 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11)  (12) 
-0.057 -0.055 -0.062 -0.071  -0.04  -0.044  -0.053  -0.054  -0.066 -0.073 -0.037  -0.037  Relative Income 
[0.040] [0.039] [0.040]  [0.039]*  [0.039] [0.038] 
Relative Income 
[0.038] [0.038]  [0.039]*  [0.038]* [0.039] [0.039] 
0.133 0.133 0.138 0.145 0.121 0.126  0.13 0.132  0.141 0.147 0.118  0.119  Relative 
Income, sq.  [0.046]*** [0.045]*** [0.046]*** [0.045]*** [0.045]*** [0.044]*** 
Relative Income, 
sq.  [0.045]*** [0.045]*** [0.046]*** [0.044]*** [0.045]*** [0.045]*** 
0.232 0.246 0.213 0.211 0.227 0.238  0.234  0.242  0.218 0.212 0.23 0.234  Change in US 
real interest rate  [0.086]*** [0.085]***  [0.087]**  [0.085]**  [0.086]*** [0.084]*** 
Change in US 
real interest rate  [0.086]*** [0.086]***  [0.087]**  [0.084]**  [0.086]*** [0.086]*** 
0.03  0.03  0.029 0.029 0.028 0.028  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.029 0.028  0.028  Volatility of 
TOT*OPN  [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.012]** 
Volatility of 
TOT*OPN  [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.012]** 
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001  Inflation 
volatility  [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] 
Inflation 
volatility  [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] 
0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003  0.002  0.002  0.003 0.004 0.002  0.002  Fiscal 
Procyclicality  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Fiscal 
Procyclicality  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
0.011 0.01  0.01 0.009  0.008 0.007  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.008  0.008  Oil Exporters 
[0.006]*  [0.006]*  [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Oil Exporters 
[0.006]* [0.006]* [0.006]*  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006] 
0.003 0.005 -0.005 -0.006 0.002  0.004  0.004 0.005  -0.005  -0.006 0.005 0.005  Private credit 
creation  [0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
Private credit 
creation  [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
0.01  0.021  0.015 -0.105 0.011  0.031  0.009 0.053 0.015 -0.124 0.009 0.024  Total 
Reserve/GDP  [0.015] [0.072] [0.015] [0.073] [0.015] [0.050] 
Total 
Reserve/GDP  [0.014] [0.058] [0.015] [0.067]* [0.014] [0.049] 
-0.021 -0.031 -0.021 -0.043      -0.024  -0.011          Monetary 
Independ. (MI)  [0.017] [0.024] [0.017]  [0.024]*     
PC of MI & 
ERS   [0.016]  [0.023]      
  0.092   0.15       -0.095          MI x reserves 
 [0.131]  [0.133]    
MI_ERS x 
reserves    [0.124]      
-0.009 0.004      -0.005 0.007      -0.034  -0.078      Exchange Rate 
Stability (ERS)  [0.007] [0.010]      [0.007] [0.010] 
PC of MI & 
KAO     [0.019]*  [0.027]***    
  -0.105      -0.091        0.295      ERS x reserves 
 [0.061]*       [0.063]
15% 
MI_KAO x 
reserves      [0.139]**    
   -0.015  -0.035  -0.012  -0.023         -0.016  -0.012  KA Openness 
   [0.009]*  [0.013]***  [0.009]  [0.013]* 
PC of ERS. & 
KAO       [0.010]  [0.016] 
    0.129    0.068          -0.033  KAOPEN x 
reserves      [0.062]**    [0.064] 
ERS_KAO x 
reserves        [ 0 . 1 0 1 ]  
# of Obs.  180 180 180 180 180 180  # of Obs.  180 180 180 180 180 180 
Adjusted R2  0.22 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.24  Adjusted R2  0.22 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.22 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimated coefficients of the dummies for East 
Asia and Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa are not reported.   51
 Table 4-3: Output Volatility: Emerging Market Countries (EMG), 1972 – 2006, Panels of 5-year Windows  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
-0.032  -0.04  -0.033  -0.026  -0.031  -0.039  -0.036 -0.038 -0.031 -0.032 -0.033 -0.044  Relative Income 
[0.024]  [0.024]*  [0.024] [0.025] [0.024] [0.026] 
Relative Income 
[0.023]  [0.022]*  [0.023] [0.024] [0.023]  [0.025]* 
0.046 0.056 0.048 0.038 0.045 0.056  0.049  0.052  0.047  0.049  0.046  0.064  Relative 
Income, sq.  [0.030]  [0.030]*  [0.029]*  [0.032] [0.029] [0.034] 
Relative Income, 
sq.  [0.028]* [0.027]* [0.028]*  [0.030]  [0.028]  [0.033]* 
0.204  0.212 0.2 0.198  0.196 0.2  0.207  0.212  0.194  0.196  0.2 0.21  Change in US 
real interest rate  [0.055]*** [0.054]*** [0.055]*** [0.054]*** [0.054]*** [0.054]*** 
Change in US 
real interest rate  [0.052]*** [0.051]*** [0.053]*** [0.053]*** [0.052]*** [0.053]*** 
0.006 0.003 0.011 0.013 0.006 0.001  0.015  0.014  0.013  0.013  0.014  0.013  Volatility of 
TOT*OPN  [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] 
Volatility of 
TOT*OPN  [0.013] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] 
0.057  0.06  0.049 0.043 0.054 0.059  0.039 0.04 0.043  0.043 0.04 0.042  Inflation 
volatility  [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Inflation 
volatility  [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  Fiscal 
Procyclicality  [0.002]** [0.002]**  [0.002]*  [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** 
Fiscal 
Procyclicality  [0.002]*  [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** 
0.011  0.013  0.012  0.012  0.01  0.012  0.013 0.014 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.011  Oil Exporters 
[0.005]** [0.005]*** [0.005]** [0.005]*** [0.005]**  [0.005]** 
Oil Exporters 
[0.005]***  [0.004]***  [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.005]** 
-0.007 -0.004 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.003  -0.006  -0.004  -0.008  -0.008  -0.006  -0.005  Private credit 
creation  [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Private credit 
creation  [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] 
0.026 0.105 0.028 0.041 0.028 0.059  0.027  0.089  0.029 0.04 0.027  0.053  Total 
Reserve/GDP  [0.008]*** [0.038]*** [0.008]***  [0.035]  [0.008]***  [0.024]** 
Total 
Reserve/GDP  [0.008]*** [0.030]*** [0.008]***  [0.033]  [0.008]***  [0.023]** 
-0.017  -0.005  -0.02  -0.013      -0.012  0.01       Monetary 
Independ. (MI)  [0.010]*  [0.014] [0.010]** [0.013]     
PC of MI & 
ERS   [0.010]  [0.013]      
  -0.081    -0.043        -0.139       MI x reserves 
 [0.063]  [0.061]    
MI_ERS x 
reserves    [0.065]**      
0.004 0.017      0.005 0.017      -0.017  -0.014      Exchange Rate 
Stability (ERS)  [0.005] [0.007]**      [0.005] [0.007]** 
PC of MI & 
KAO     [0.010]
11% [0.013]     
  -0.081        -0.072      -0.018     ERS x reserves 
  [0.033]**      [0.032]** 
MI_KAO x 
reserves      [ 0 . 0 6 0 ]     
    -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003          -0.001 0.006  KA Openness 
    [0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006] 
PC of ERS. & 
KAO       [0.006]  [0.009] 
      0.011    0.008        -0.047  KAOPEN x 
reserves      [0.026]    [0.026] 
ERS_KAO x 
reserves        [ 0 . 0 4 2 ]  
# of Obs.  208 208 208 208 208 208  # of Obs.  208 208 208 208 208 208 
Adjusted R2  0.47  0.5  0.44 0.41 0.46  0.5  Adjusted R2  0.39 0.42 0.41 0.41  0.4  0.41 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimated coefficients of the dummies for East 
Asia and Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa are not reported.  52
Table 5-1: Inflation Volatility: Less Developed Countries (LDC), 1972 – 2006, Panels of 5-year Windows, Robust Regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
-0.078 -0.078 -0.087 -0.078  -0.08  -0.071  -0.08  -0.084 -0.084 -0.081  -0.08  -0.075  Relative Income 
[0.026]*** [0.026]*** [0.027]*** [0.028]*** [0.026]*** [0.027]*** 
Relative Income 
[0.026]*** [0.026]*** [0.026]*** [0.027]*** [0.026]*** [0.027]*** 
0.074 0.075 0.082 0.062 0.072 0.054  0.08  0.086 0.083 0.079 0.072 0.061  Relative Income, 
sq.  [0.032]** [0.033]** [0.033]**  [0.036]*  [0.033]**  [0.036] 
Relative 
Income, sq.  [0.033]** [0.033]** [0.033]** [0.034]** [0.033]**  [0.036]* 
0.017 0.016  0.02  0.021 0.017 0.017  0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017  Volatility of 
TOT*OPN  [0.010]* [0.010]*  [0.010]**  [0.010]**  [0.010]* [0.010]* 
Volatility of 
TOT*OPN  [0.010]* [0.010]* [0.010]* [0.010]* [0.010]* [0.010]* 
0.215 0.213 0.221 0.222 0.223 0.221  0.207  0.21  0.212 0.211 0.223 0.224  Inflation Rate 
[0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** 
Inflation Rate 
[0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** 
0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005  0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005  Relative oil price 
shocks  [0.003]  [0.003] [0.003]**  [0.003]* [0.003]*  [0.003] 
Relative oil 
price shocks  [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]**  [0.003]*  [0.003]* 
-0.008 0.033 -0.012 -0.01  -0.01 -0.022  -0.01  0.016 -0.011 -0.02 -0.009 -0.026  Total 
Reserve/GDP  [0.012] [0.057] [0.012] [0.050] [0.012] [0.035] 
Total 
Reserve/GDP  [0.012] [0.049] [0.012] [0.045] [0.012] [0.034] 
-0.01  -0.001 -0.011 -0.006      0  0.008       Monetary 
Independ. (MI)  [0.012] [0.017] [0.012] [0.017]     
PC of MI & 
ERS   [0.012] [0.018]      
  -0.058   -0.04       -0.059      
MI x reserves 
 [0.094]  [0.093]    
MI_ERS x 
reserves   [0.104]     
0.007 0.011      0.007  0.01     0.006 0.003     Exchange Rate 
Stability (ERS)  [0.005] [0.008]      [0.005] [0.008] 
PC of MI & 
KAO     [0.013] [0.018]    
  -0.027      -0.011     0.019   
ERS x reserves 
  [0.045]      [0.043] 
MI_KAO x 
reserves     [0.083]   
    0.008 0.004 0.009 0.004       0.016 0.012  KA Openness 
    [0.006] [0.008] [0.006] [0.008] 
PC of ERS. & 
KAO       [0.008]** [0.011] 
    0.03    0.032       0.031  KAOPEN x 
reserves      [0.036]    [0.035] 
ERS_KAO x 
reserves       [0.057] 
# of Obs.  429 429 429 429 429 429  # of Obs.  429 429 429 429 429 429 
Adjusted R2  0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59  Adjusted R2  0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58  0.6  0.59 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimated coefficients of the dummies for 
Middle East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa are not reported.   53
Table 5-2: Inflation Volatility: Less Developed, Commodity Exporting Countries (LDC-CMD), 1972 – 2006, Panels of 5-year Windows, 
Robust Regression  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
-0.184  -0.18  -0.162  -0.16  -0.147 -0.143  -0.169 -0.167 -0.151 -0.151 -0.152 -0.152 
Relative Income 
[0.066]***  [0.065]***  [0.066]** [0.066]** [0.069]** [0.068]** 
Relative Income 
[0.066]** [0.065]** [0.065]** [0.064]** [0.068]** [0.069]** 
0.234 0.232 0.218 0.217 0.198 0.198  0.223 0.222 0.208 0.208 0.205 0.204  Relative Income, 
sq.  [0.087]***  [0.086]***  [0.087]** [0.087]** [0.091]** [0.088]** 
Relative 
Income, sq.  [0.088]** [0.087]** [0.087]** [0.086]** [0.089]** [0.090]** 
0.06  0.059 0.054 0.055 0.047 0.047  0.055 0.055 0.051 0.051 0.048 0.048  Volatility of 
TOT*OPN  [0.022]***  [0.022]***  [0.022]** [0.022]** [0.023]** [0.022]** 
Volatility of 
TOT*OPN  [0.022]** [0.022]** [0.022]** [0.022]** [0.022]** [0.023]** 
0.323 0.315 0.319 0.315 0.303 0.288  0.294 0.295 0.319 0.313 0.287  0.29 
Inflation Rate 
[0.033]*** [0.032]*** [0.031]*** [0.032]*** [0.035]*** [0.034]*** 
Inflation Rate 
[0.032]*** [0.031]*** [0.031]*** [0.031]*** [0.034]*** [0.035]*** 
0.021 0.023 0.018 0.019 0.024 0.025  0.026 0.027 0.019 0.018 0.027 0.026  Relative oil price 
shocks  [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.010]**  [0.009]*** 
Relative oil 
price shocks  [0.009]*** [0.009]***  [0.009]**  [0.009]**  [0.009]*** [0.009]*** 
-0.036 0.081 -0.032 -0.033 -0.039 -0.011  -0.046 0.075 -0.033 -0.093 -0.044 -0.029  Total 
Reserve/GDP  [0.032] [0.160] [0.032] [0.163] [0.034] [0.116] 
Total 
Reserve/GDP  [0.033] [0.132] [0.032] [0.153] [0.033] [0.115] 
-0.076 -0.054 -0.082 -0.069     -0.061  -0.022       Monetary 
Independ. (MI)  [0.036]** [0.053] [0.035]** [0.052]    
PC of MI & 
ERS   [0.037]  [0.053]      
  -0.113  -0.084      -0.262      
MI x reserves 
  [0.291]  [0.299]   
MI_ERS x 
reserves    [ 0 . 2 7 8 ]       
-0.004  0.012     -0.003  0.01     -0.094  -0.11     Exchange Rate 
Stability (ERS)  [0.017] [0.023]      [0.017] [0.023] 
PC of MI & 
KAO     [0.038]**  [0.057]*    
  -0.122      -0.118      0.124    
ERS x reserves 
  [0.134]      [0.146] 
MI_KAO x 
reserves      [ 0 . 3 1 4 ]     
   -0.026 -0.041 -0.023 -0.034          -0.028 -0.023 
KA Openness 
   [0.019] [0.028] [0.019] [0.029] 
PC of ERS. & 
KAO       [0.026]  [0.040] 
    0.095    0.079        -0.033  KAOPEN x 
reserves     [0.137]  [0.145] 
ERS_KAO x 
reserves        [ 0 . 2 3 5 ]  
# of Obs.  182 182 182 182 182 182  # of Obs.  182 182 182 182 182 182 
Adjusted R2  0.48 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.45 0.44  Adjusted R2  0.45 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.44 0.44 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 54 
Table 5-3: Inflation Volatility: Emerging Market Countries (EMG), 1972 – 2006, Panels of 5-year Windows, Robust Regression  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
-0.078 -0.075 -0.087 -0.085 -0.083 -0.082  -0.08  -0.081 -0.085 -0.088 -0.079 -0.079  Relative Income 
[0.031]**  [0.031]** [0.031]*** [0.034]** [0.031]*** [0.034]** 
Relative Income 
[0.029]*** [0.030]*** [0.031]*** [0.032]*** [0.030]***  [0.033]** 
0.082  0.08  0.087 0.084 0.082  0.08  0.085 0.087 0.087 0.094 0.078 0.079  Relative 
Income, sq.  [0.039]** [0.040]** [0.039]**  [0.046]*  [0.039]**  [0.048]* 
Relative 
Income, sq.  [0.037]** [0.038]** [0.038]** [0.042]** [0.038]**  [0.045]* 
0.102  0.1  0.105 0.105 0.099 0.098  0.106 0.104 0.099 0.099 0.096 0.096  Volatility of 
TOT*OPN  [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.017]*** 
Volatility of 
TOT*OPN  [0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.016]*** 
0.177 0.177 0.184 0.185 0.184 0.186  0.167  0.17  0.178 0.176  0.18  0.181  Inflation Rate 
[0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** 
Inflation Rate 
[0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** 
0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003  0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003  Relative oil 
price shocks  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Relative oil 
price shocks  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
-0.005 0.034 -0.009 0.008 -0.009 -0.004  -0.004 0.015 -0.005 0.012 -0.008 -0.007  Total 
Reserve/GDP  [0.011] [0.053] [0.012] [0.051] [0.012] [0.034] 
Total 
Reserve/GDP  [0.011] [0.043] [0.011] [0.047] [0.011] [0.033] 
-0.009 0.002 -0.006 0.001      -0.003 0.004          Monetary 
Independ. (MI)  [0.014] [0.019] [0.014] [0.019]     
PC of MI & 
ERS   [0.013]  [0.019]      
  -0.058    -0.039       -0.042       MI x reserves 
 [0.087]  [0.087]    
MI_ERS x 
reserves    [ 0 . 0 9 2 ]       
0.006  0.01     0.005  0.009     0.013  0.018     Exchange Rate 
Stability (ERS)  [0.007] [0.010]      [0.007] [0.010] 
PC of MI & 
KAO     [0.015]  [0.020]    
  -0.024      -0.016      -0.032     ERS x reserves 
  [0.045]      [0.044] 
MI_KAO x 
reserves      [ 0 . 0 8 6 ]     
   0.011  0.011  0.011  0.01       0.017  0.017  KA Openness 
    [0.007]* [0.009] [0.006]* [0.009] 
PC of ERS. & 
KAO       [0.009]*  [0.012] 
    0.002    0.006        -0.002  KAOPEN x 
reserves      [0.038]    [0.037] 
ERS_KAO x 
reserves        [ 0 . 0 5 9 ]  
# of Obs.  215 215 215 215 215 215  # of Obs.  215 215 215 215 215 215 
Adjusted R2  0.68 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.68  Adjusted R2  0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.69 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimated coefficients of the dummies for 
Middle East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa are not reported.   55
Table 6-1: Inflation: Less Developed Countries (LDC), 1972 – 2006, Panels of 5-year Windows, Robust Regression  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
-0.028 -0.015 0.013 0.036 -0.028 0.005  -0.022 -0.019 0.004 0.012 -0.022 0.016  Relative Income 
[0.052] [0.052] [0.053] [0.055] [0.050] [0.052] 
Relative Income 
[0.054] [0.054] [0.055] [0.055] [0.050] [0.051] 
0.059 0.045 0.014 -0.022 0.074 0.027  0.052 0.049 0.018 0.005 0.068 0.013  Relative 
Income, sq.  [0.062] [0.063] [0.065] [0.068] [0.060] [0.064] 
Relative 
Income, sq.  [0.065] [0.065] [0.066] [0.068] [0.060] [0.064] 
0.876  0.91  0.71  0.714 0.897 0.921  0.901 0.898  0.8  0.771 0.861 0.871  World Output 
Gap  [0.310]*** [0.310]***  [0.321]**  [0.321]**  [0.300]*** [0.298]*** 
World Output 
Gap  [0.323]*** [0.323]***  [0.328]**  [0.330]**  [0.300]*** [0.296]*** 
-0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.018 -0.008 -0.012  -0.02  -0.02  -0.021 -0.023 -0.007 -0.012  Trade openness 
[0.008]* [0.008]* [0.008]*  [0.008]** [0.007]  [0.008] 
Trade openness 
[0.008]** [0.008]**  [0.008]***  [0.008]***  [0.007]  [0.008] 
0.032 0.031 0.027 0.025 0.022  0.02  0.042 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.019 0.018  Volatility of 
TOT*OPN  [0.021] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022] [0.020] [0.020] 
Volatility of 
TOT*OPN  [0.022]* [0.022]* [0.022]* [0.022]*  [0.020]  [0.020] 
0.311  0.31  0.295 0.293 0.304 0.303  0.3  0.3  0.297 0.297  0.3  0.299  Inflation 
volatility  [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** 
Inflation 
volatility  [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** 
-0.016 -0.022 -0.011 -0.014 -0.017 -0.025  -0.015 -0.017 -0.012 -0.013 -0.016 -0.024  Private Credit 
Creation  [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013]  [0.013]* 
Private Credit 
Creation  [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013]  [0.013]* 
0.137 0.146 0.116 0.116 0.144 0.149  0.127  0.13  0.111 0.112 0.142 0.147  M2 Growth 
Volatility  [0.036]*** [0.036]*** [0.038]*** [0.037]*** [0.035]*** [0.035]*** 
M2 Growth 
Volatility  [0.038]*** [0.038]*** [0.038]*** [0.039]*** [0.035]*** [0.035]*** 
-0.001  -0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.003  -0.002  0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.003  -0.002  Fiscal 
Procyclicality  [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Fiscal 
Procyclicality  [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
0.044 0.044 0.038 0.037  0.04  0.04  0.039 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038  Oil Shock 
[0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Oil Shock 
[0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
-0.021 -0.122 0.014 -0.002 -0.01 -0.136  -0.001 -0.114 0.011 -0.058 -0.002 -0.128  Total 
Reserve/GDP  [0.024] [0.104] [0.025] [0.089] [0.024]  [0.061]** 
Total 
Reserve/GDP  [0.025] [0.090] [0.026] [0.083] [0.023]  [0.059]** 
0.037  0.033  0.063  0.067     -0.092  -0.125       Monetary 
Independ. (MI)  [0.022]* [0.030]  [0.022]***  [0.031]**     
PC of MI & 
ERS   [0.022]***  [0.033]***      
  0.029    -0.067       0.248       MI x reserves 
 [0.169]  [0.166]    
MI_ERS x 
reserves    [ 0 . 1 8 9 ]       
-0.074  -0.096     -0.08  -0.099     -0.009  -0.031     Exchange Rate 
Stability (ERS)  [0.010]***  [0.014]***    [0.009]***  [0.013]*** 
PC of MI & 
KAO     [0.025]  [0.034]    
  0.161      0.152      0.138     ERS x reserves 
 [0.082]*       [0.075]** 
MI_KAO x 
reserves      [ 0 . 1 5 9 ]     
   -0.037  -0.051  -0.048  -0.059       -0.131  -0.16  KA Openness 
    [0.011]*** [0.015]*** [0.010]*** [0.013]*** 
PC of ERS. & 
KAO       [0.014]***  [0.018]*** 
    0.095    0.086        0.238  KAOPEN x 
reserves      [0.068]    [0.064] 
ERS_KAO x 
reserves        [ 0 . 1 0 4 ] * *  
# of Obs.  403 403 403 403 403 403  # of Obs.  403 403 403 403 403 403 
Adjusted R2  0.72 0.72 0.68 0.68 0.73 0.74  Adjusted R2  0.68 0.68 0.66 0.66 0.73 0.74 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimated coefficients of the dummies for Latin 
American and the Caribbean and Eastern Europe are not reported.   56
Table 6-2: Inflation: Less Developed, Commodity Exporting Countries (LDC-CMD), 1972 – 2006, Panels of 5-year Windows, Robust 
Regression  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
-0.015 -0.003 -0.044  -0.04  -0.012 -0.004  -0.088 -0.078 -0.082 -0.078 -0.013 -0.012 
Relative Income 
[0.083] [0.084] [0.086] [0.088] [0.079] [0.079] 
Relative Income 
[0.087] [0.088] [0.088] [0.089] [0.078] [0.077] 
0.019 0.007 0.037 0.032 0.038 0.029  0.092 0.082 0.067 0.063 0.042 0.038  Relative 
Income, sq.  [0.100] [0.101] [0.104] [0.106] [0.094] [0.095] 
Relative 
Income, sq.  [0.106] [0.106] [0.107] [0.107] [0.094] [0.093] 
1.355 1.35  1.08  1.1  1.39 1.372  1.079 1.01 0.955  1.025 1.35 1.315  World Output 
Gap  [0.521]** [0.530]** [0.540]**  [0.560]* [0.499]***  [0.503]*** 
World Output 
Gap  [0.555]* [0.558]* [0.557]* [0.566]*  [0.496]***  [0.491]*** 
0.006  0  -0.018 -0.018 0.001 -0.002  -0.019 -0.022 -0.021 -0.022 -0.004 -0.003 
Trade openness 
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.016] [0.016] 
Trade openness 
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.015] [0.015] 
-0.013 -0.017 -0.001 -0.004 -0.025 -0.027  0.005  0.001  0.016  0.013 -0.028 -0.026  Volatility of 
TOT*OPN  [0.029] [0.029] [0.030] [0.031] [0.028] [0.028] 
Volatility of 
TOT*OPN  [0.030] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.027] [0.027] 
0.297 0.296 0.285 0.284 0.289 0.289  0.29  0.291 0.288 0.287 0.286 0.286  Inflation 
volatility  [0.016]*** [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.018]*** [0.016]*** [0.016]*** 
Inflation 
volatility  [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.016]*** [0.015]*** 
-0.043 -0.046 -0.037 -0.038 -0.058 -0.061  -0.052 -0.056 -0.038 -0.036  -0.06  -0.062  Private Credit 
Creation  [0.038] [0.038] [0.039] [0.040] [0.036]  [0.036]* 
Private Credit 
Creation  [0.040] [0.040] [0.041] [0.041]  [0.036]*  [0.035]* 
0.209 0.226 0.177 0.191 0.226 0.234  0.21  0.217 0.171  0.18  0.231 0.227  M2 Growth 
Volatility  [0.059]*** [0.060]*** [0.061]*** [0.064]*** [0.056]*** [0.057]*** 
M2 Growth 
Volatility  [0.062]*** [0.063]*** [0.063]*** [0.064]*** [0.056]*** [0.055]*** 
-0.006 -0.005 0.001 0.001 -0.009 -0.007  -0.003 -0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.009 -0.007  Fiscal 
Procyclicality  [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Fiscal 
Procyclicality  [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] 
0.05  0.048 0.043 0.043 0.045 0.044  0.041 0.039 0.043 0.044 0.042 0.042 
Oil Shock 
[0.009]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** 
Oil Shock 
[0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** 
-0.046 -0.137 0.027  0.1  -0.031 -0.159  -0.005 -0.191 0.023  0.114 -0.016 -0.168  Total 
Reserve/GDP  [0.034] [0.167] [0.035] [0.184] [0.033] [0.112] 
Total 
Reserve/GDP  [0.036] [0.144] [0.036] [0.175] [0.031] [0.106] 
0.048 0.044  0.07  0.099     -0.141 -0.198       Monetary 
Independ. (MI)  [0.039] [0.057]  [0.040]*  [0.060]*    
PC of MI & 
ERS   [0.041]*** [0.056]***      
  -0.009   -0.19      0.408      MI x reserves 
  [0.306]  [0.332]   
MI_ERS x 
reserves   [0.305]     
-0.104 -0.126     -0.108 -0.13     -0.002 0.028     Exchange Rate 
Stability (ERS)  [0.017]*** [0.023]***     [0.016]*** [0.022]*** 
PC of MI & 
KAO     [0.048] [0.069]    
  0.184      0.193     -0.188    ERS x reserves 
  [0.146]      [0.146] 
MI_KAO x 
reserves     [0.359]   
   -0.049 -0.054 -0.061 -0.071       -0.178  -0.217 
KA Openness 
   [0.022]** [0.032]*  [0.019]***  [0.029]** 
PC of ERS. & 
KAO       [0.024]*** [0.035]*** 
   0.026  0.067       0.317  KAOPEN x 
reserves     [0.154]  [0.141] 
ERS_KAO x 
reserves       [0.217] 
# of Obs.  173 173 173 173 173 173  # of Obs.  173 173 173 173 173 173 
Adjusted R2  0.72 0.72 0.68 0.67 0.74 0.74  Adjusted R2  0.67 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.74 0.75 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dummy for Latin America is not reported.   57
Table 6-3: Inflation: Emerging Market Countries (EMG), 1972 – 2006, Panels of 5-year Windows, Robust Regression  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
-0.079 -0.062 -0.019 -0.039 -0.073 -0.071  -0.021 -0.016  0.002  -0.002 -0.075 -0.066  Relative Income 
[0.090] [0.092] [0.085] [0.090] [0.088] [0.095] 
Relative Income 
[0.088] [0.088] [0.087] [0.090] [0.086] [0.093] 
0.122 0.101 0.075 0.107 0.134 0.138  0.063 0.055 0.048 0.057 0.132 0.118  Relative 
Income, sq.  [0.110] [0.112] [0.104] [0.115] [0.108] [0.122] 
Relative 
Income, sq.  [0.108] [0.108] [0.107] [0.112] [0.106] [0.119] 
0.994 1.016 0.781 0.812 0.888 0.939  0.978 0.974 0.928 0.937  0.93  0.926  World Output 
Gap  [0.440]** [0.444]**  [0.422]*  [0.425]*  [0.433]** [0.431]** 
World Output 
Gap  [0.439]** [0.439]** [0.431]** [0.435]** [0.423]** [0.425]** 
-0.012 -0.011 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001  -0.01  -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006  Trade openness 
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] [0.012] 
Trade openness 
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011] 
0.068 0.07 0.052 0.051 0.066 0.067  0.062 0.064 0.056 0.055 0.068 0.069  Volatility of 
TOT*OPN  [0.040]*  [0.041]* [0.039]  [0.039] [0.040]*  [0.039]* 
Volatility of 
TOT*OPN  [0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.040]  [0.039]*  [0.039]* 
0.443 0.444 0.443 0.446 0.423 0.432  0.458 0.457 0.455 0.455 0.432 0.431  Inflation 
volatility  [0.023]*** [0.023]*** [0.023]*** [0.023]*** [0.023]*** [0.023]*** 
Inflation 
volatility  [0.023]*** [0.023]*** [0.023]*** [0.023]*** [0.022]*** [0.023]*** 
-0.026 -0.031 -0.039 -0.039 -0.031 -0.037  -0.038  -0.04  -0.044 -0.045  -0.03  -0.031  Private Credit 
Creation  [0.018]  [0.019]  [0.018]**  [0.018]** [0.018]* [0.018]** 
Private Credit 
Creation  [0.018]** [0.018]** [0.018]** [0.018]**  [0.018]*  [0.018]* 
0.128 0.136 0.155 0.145 0.178 0.169  0.123 0.128 0.142  0.15  0.151 0.155  M2 Growth 
Volatility  [0.051]**  [0.052]*** [0.050]*** [0.050]*** [0.051]*** [0.050]*** 
M2 Growth 
Volatility  [0.051]**  [0.051]**  [0.051]*** [0.051]*** [0.050]*** [0.050]*** 
-0.01  -0.01 -0.008 -0.008 -0.013 -0.012  -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.012 -0.012  Fiscal 
Procyclicality  [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]  [0.007]*  [0.007]* 
Fiscal 
Procyclicality  [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]  [0.007]*  [0.007]* 
0.027 0.026 0.015 0.015  0.02  0.02  0.021  0.02  0.016 0.016 0.022 0.021  Oil Shock 
[0.008]*** [0.008]***  [0.008]*  [0.008]*  [0.008]**  [0.008]** 
Oil Shock 
[0.008]*** [0.008]**  [0.008]*  [0.008]*  [0.008]***  [0.008]*** 
-0.023 -0.138 -0.018  0.01  -0.02 -0.048  -0.026 -0.126 -0.026 -0.005 -0.018 -0.037  Total 
Reserve/GDP  [0.030] [0.121] [0.029] [0.108] [0.030] [0.076] 
Total 
Reserve/GDP  [0.030] [0.101] [0.030] [0.106] [0.030] [0.075] 
0.034  0.012  0.02  0.019     -0.026  -0.063       Monetary 
Independ. (MI)  [0.031] [0.043] [0.031] [0.042]     
PC of MI & 
ERS   [0.032]  [0.044]      
 0.115  0.002      0.219         MI x reserves 
 [0.197]  [0.188]    
MI_ERS x 
reserves    [0.210]      
-0.04  -0.059     -0.042  -0.059     -0.067  -0.061     Exchange Rate 
Stability (ERS)  [0.016]** [0.023]***      [0.016]***  [0.021]*** 
PC of MI & 
KAO     [0.034]*  [0.044]    
 0.118      0.112       -0.043     ERS x reserves 
 [0.102]      [0.097] 
MI_KAO x 
reserves      [ 0 . 2 0 2 ]     
    -0.048 -0.038 -0.052 -0.042          -0.092 -0.098  KA Openness 
    [0.014]*** [0.019]** [0.014]*** [0.018]** 
PC of ERS. & 
KAO       [0.020]***  [0.028]*** 
     -0.057  -0.058            0.037  KAOPEN x 
reserves       [0.086]  [0.086] 
ERS_KAO x 
reserves        [ 0 . 1 3 9 ]  
# of Obs.  203 203 203 203 203 203  # of Obs.  203 203 203 203 203 203 
Adjusted R2  0.78  0.78 0.8  0.8 0.79 0.8  Adjusted R2  0.78 0.78 0.79 0.79  0.8  0.79 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimated coefficients of the dummies for Latin 
American and the Caribbean and Eastern Europe are not reported. 58 
Table 7: Summary of the Effects of the Trilemma Configurations 
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Table 8: Output Volatility: the Trilemma Indexes Interacted w/ different levels of PCGDP 
Developing Countries (LDC)  Emerging Market Countries (EMG) 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
-0.012 -0.013  -0.011  0.001  0.001  -0.005  Private credit creation 
(% of GDP)  [0.008] [0.007]*  [0.008]  [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] 
-0.042   -0.023  -0.092    -0.068  MI x  
   Int’l reserves  [0.068]   [0.065]  [0.068]    [0.065] 
-0.014   -0.009  -0.006    -0.01  MI x  
   High PCGDP  [0.017]   [0.016]  [0.020]    [0.017] 
-0.016   -0.019  -0.007    -0.016  MI x 
    Medium PCGDP  [0.012]   [0.012]  [0.014]    [0.014] 
-0.005   -0.018  0.009    -0.022  MI x  
   Low PCGDP  [0.015]   [0.013]  [0.023]    [0.018] 
-0.036 -0.042    -0.082  -0.067    ERS x  
   Int’l reserves  [0.033]  [0.031]  [0.037]**  [0.032]**  
0.002  0.012   0.013  0.017   ERS x  
   High PCGDP  [0.010] [0.009]    [0.012]  [0.009]*   
0.003  0.003   0.018  0.017   ERS x  
   Medium PCGDP  [0.006]  [0.005]  [0.007]**  [0.007]**  
-0.011  -0.005   0.019  0.005   ERS x  
   Low PCGDP  [0.007]  [0.006]   [0.016]  [0.010]  
 -0.014  -0.001    0.026  0.032  KAOPEN x  
   Int’l reserves   [0.027]  [0.027]    [0.027]  [0.027] 
 -0.012  -0.015    -0.012  -0.018  KAOPEN x  
   High PCGDP   [0.010]  [0.009]    [0.010]  [0.010]* 
 0 0    -0.005  -0.008  KAOPEN x  
   Medium PCGDP   [0.006]  [0.006]    [0.006]  [0.006] 
 -0.004  -0.01    0.037  0.039  KAOPEN x  
   Low PCGDP   [0.009]  [0.010]   [0.016]**  [0.018]** 
Adjusted R2  0.23 0.24  0.23  0.49  0.48  0.44 
Significance of the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms b/w the trilemma indexes and different PCGDP groups 
is tested using a Wald test. 
MI: High vs. Med.  0.04   0.85 0.00    0.26 
MI: Med. vs. Low  1.25   0.03 0.60    0.24 
MI: High vs. Low  0.32   0.42 0.42    0.51 
ERS: High vs. Med.  0.02 1.30    0.17  0.00   
ERS: Med. vs. Low  4.39** 2.60*    0.01  1.57   
ERS: High vs. Low  1.82 3.70**    0.11  1.05   
KAO: High vs. Med.   1.81  2.74*    0.45 1.27 
KAO: Med. vs. Low   0.19  0.81   6.61***  6.83*** 
KAO: High vs. Low   0.52  0.17   7.35***  8.84*** 60 
Table 9: The Impact of External Financing: Less Developed Countries 
Dependent Variable:  Output Volatility   Inflation Volatility  Level of Inflation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Total  Reserve/GDP  0.057  -0.022  0.039 0.039 0.038 -0.038 -0.074 0.162 -0.096 
  [0.058]  [0.055] [0.036] [0.086]  [0.083] [0.055] [0.145] [0.145] [0.089] 
Currency  Crisis  0.018  0.016  0.014  0.052 0.053 0.053 0.131 0.144 0.118 
 [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.016]***  [0.017]***  [0.017]*** [0.028]*** [0.028]*** [0.027]*** 
Net FDI inflows/GDP  -0.022  0.009  0.003  -0.24  -0.287 -0.286 -0.388 -0.299 -0.293 
 [0.074]  [0.075]  [0.075]  [0.065]***  [0.067]*** [0.067]***  [0.208]*  [0.219]  [0.204] 
Net  portfolio  inflows/GDP 0.124  0.136 0.15 0.172 0.258 0.237 -0.078  -0.098  -0.119 
 [0.087]  [0.087]
12%  [0.087]*  [0.179] [0.188] [0.187] [0.306] [0.326] [0.306] 
Net 'other' inflows/GDP  0.045  0.051  0.056  -0.015  -0.035  -0.03  -0.017  0.06  0.032 
 [0.030]  [0.030]*  [0.030]*  [0.042]  [0.043] [0.043] [0.071] [0.074] [0.070] 
Short-term  Debt  -0.003  0.005  0.006  0.042 0.041 0.038 0.054 0.094 0.085 
  (as % of total external debt)  [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.017] [0.023]* [0.024]*  [0.024]
11% [0.043] [0.045]**  [0.042]** 
Total  debt  service    0.047  0.058*  0.048 0.12  0.106 0.109 0.203 0.281 0.209 
  (as % of GNI)  [0.036]  [0.035]  [0.036]  [0.052]**  [0.053]** [0.053]** [0.099]**  [0.100]***  [0.096]** 
Monetary Independence (MI)  -0.021  -0.029    -0.009  -0.01    0.03  0.078   
 [0.015]  [0.015]**    [0.022]  [0.023]  [0.038]  [0.039]**   
MI x reserves  -0.003  0.063    -0.11  -0.1    -0.02  -0.223   
  [0.095]  [0.095]  [0.140]  [0.144]  [0.237]  [0.249]  
Exchange Rate Stability (ERS)  0.001    0.003  0.002    0.002  -0.084    -0.09 
  [0.007]    [0.007]  [0.011]  [0.011] [0.018]***    [0.017]*** 
ERS  x  reserves  -0.049    -0.044  0.03   0.039  0.189  0.202 
 [0.048]    [0.047]  [0.071]    [0.070] [0.121]    [0.115]* 
KA  Openness    -0.018  -0.014   0.006  0.004  -0.035  -0.052 
   [0.008]**  [0.008]*    [0.013]  [0.012]  [0.022]  [0.020]*** 
KAOPEN x reserves    0.063  0.041    0.019  0.046    -0.01  0.051 
   [0.045]  [0.044]    [0.071]  [0.068]  [0.124]  [0.112] 
Observations  313  313  313  321 321 321 306 306 306 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.21  0.22  0.21 0.6  0.59 0.59 0.75 0.73 0.76 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   61
Table 10: External Financing and Policy Orientation 
Dependent variable  Output Volatility  Inflation Volatility 
(Policy Orientation) 
Mon. Indep. & ERS 
“Financially Closed” 
Mon. Indep. & KAO 
“More Flexible Exch. R” 
ERS & KAO 
“Currency Union” 
Mon. Indep. & ERS 
“Financially Closed” 
Mon. Indep. & KAO 
“More Flexible Exch. R” 
ERS & KAO 
“Currency Union” 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Total  Reserve/GDP  0.04  0.039 0.017 0.02  0.034 0.032  0  0  0.006 0.002 0.004 0.004 
 [0.014]***  [0.014]***  [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.014]**  [0.014]** [0.021]  [0.022]  [0.021] [0.020] [0.023] [0.023] 
Currency  Crisis  0.015  0.015 0.014 0.014 0.017 0.019 0.053  0.052  0.042 0.043 0.048 0.046 
 [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.011] [0.011]*  [0.017]***  [0.017]***  [0.018]**  [0.017]** [0.018]*** [0.018]** 
(Policy Orientation)  0.002  0.004 -0.001  0.002 0.002 -0.009  -0.011 -0.005 0.016 0.004 0.006 0.014 
 [0.004]  [0.007]  [0.005]  [0.008]  [0.005] [0.008]  [0.007]* [0.011]  [0.008]** [0.012]  [0.007]  [0.012] 
(Policy Orientation) -0.034  -0.034  0.032  0.028  -0.011  -0.003  0.004  -0.005  -0.015 -0.011 -0.008 -0.007 
       x Reserves  [0.024]  [0.023]  [0.024]  [0.024]  [0.023] [0.023] [0.035]  [0.036]  [0.038] [0.037] [0.035] [0.036] 
Net FDI inflows/GDP  -0.089  -0.196  0.015  0.023  -0.038  -0.035 -0.251  -0.302  -0.179 -0.164 -0.394  -0.41 
 [0.086]  [0.086]**  [0.080]  [0.081]  [0.112] [0.112]  [0.070]***  [0.072]***  [0.071]** [0.069]** [0.180]** [0.182]** 
Net FDI inflow  0.174  0.332  -0.223  -0.181  0.022  0  -0.034  -0.111  -0.508  -0.664  0.206  0.189 
       x (Policy Orientation) [0.176]  [0.175]* [0.188] [0.191]  [0.151] [0.152] [0.245]  [0.261] [0.289]* [0.283]**  [0.200]  [0.202] 
Net portfolio inflows/GDP  0.181  -0.121  0.191  0.199  0.06  0.061  0.149  0.183  0.278  0.237  -0.102  -0.137 
 [0.133]  [0.131]  [0.090]**  [0.091]** [0.105]  [0.104]  [0.196]  [0.204]  [0.225] [0.217] [0.369] [0.375] 
Net Portfolio inflow  -0.066  0.234  -0.348  -0.277  0.298  0.332  0.042  0.14  -0.679  -0.948  0.363  0.451 
       x (Policy Orientation) [0.176]  [0.174]  [0.273] [0.284]  [0.187]
11% [0.190]*  [0.924]  [0.958]  [0.463] [0.464]** [0.435]  [0.446] 
Net  'other'  inflows/GDP 0.059 0.066  0.028 0.03 0.079 0.08 0.005 0.026 -0.064  -0.052  -0.03  -0.033 
 [0.044]  [0.044]  [0.032]  [0.033]  [0.034]** [0.033]**  [0.066]  [0.069]  [0.048] [0.047] [0.052] [0.052] 
Net 'Other' inflow   0.009  0.004  0.097  0.084  -0.106  -0.094  -0.073  -0.095  0.166  0.174  -0.053  -0.03 
       x (Policy Orientation) [0.056]  [0.056]  [0.069] [0.070]  [0.068]
12% [0.070]  [0.085]  [0.089]  [0.112] [0.109] [0.106] [0.110] 
Short-term Debt  (as % of  -0.003  0.005  0  -0.004  0.002  0.001  0.034  0.017  0.04  0.044  0.047  0.061 
  total external debt)  [0.018]  [0.021]  [0.017]  [0.019]  [0.018] [0.020] [0.025]  [0.031]  [0.025] [0.028]  [0.025]*  [0.029]** 
Short-term  Debt      -0.026  0.020  -0.002   0.049   -0.015  -0.051 
       x (Policy Orientation)    [0.030]  [0.032]  [0.032]   [0.047]   [0.046]  [0.049] 
Total  debt  service  0.054  0.072 0.069 0.097 0.055 0.008 0.088  0.149  0.149 0.081 0.111 0.114 
   (as % of GNI)  [0.036]  [0.044]  [0.035]*  [0.041]**  [0.035]  [0.042] [0.053]*  [0.068]**  [0.055]*** [0.060]  [0.055]** [0.069]* 
Total debt service     -0.038    -0.102    0.172    -0.187    0.271    -0.002 
       x (Policy Orientation)   [0.067]   [0.080]    [0.074]**   [0.106]*   [0.117]**   [0.115] 
Observations  313  313 313 313 313 313 319  319  319 319 319 319 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.2  0.23  0.21  0.21 0.2 0.21  0.56 0.55 0.55  0.55  0.54  0.54 
Robust p values in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10 (con’t): External Financing and Policy Orientation 
Dependent variable  Level of Inflation    
Policy Orientation 
Mon. Indep. & ERS 
“Financially Closed” 
Mon. Indep. & KAO 
“More Flexible Exch. R” 
ERS & KAO 
“Currency Union”     
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)             
Total  Reserve/GDP  0.03  0.025 0.051 0.052 0.034 0.044        
  [0.039] [0.039] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037]        
Currency  Crisis  0.167 0.162 0.138 0.137 0.142 0.134        
  [0.029]*** [0.029]*** [0.029]*** [0.029]*** [0.028]*** [0.028]***       
(Policy Orientation)  0.014 -0.011 0.037 0.029 -0.045 -0.013        
 [0.012]  [0.018]  [0.014]***  [0.022] [0.011]*** [0.019]        
(Policy Orientation)   0.029  0.04  -0.069  -0.067  0.037  0.022        
       x Reserves  [0.061]  [0.062] [0.063] [0.064] [0.057] [0.058]        
Net  FDI  inflows/GDP  -0.186 -0.146 -0.393  -0.39  -0.404 -0.366        
 [0.240]  [0.242]  [0.229]*  [0.230]* [0.302]  [0.304]        
Net FDI inflow  -0.31  -0.435  0.205  0.203  0.212  0.19        
       x (Policy Orientation) [0.464] [0.469] [0.505] [0.512] [0.379] [0.382]        
Net portfolio inflows/GDP  -0.266  -0.246  0.032  0.037  0.236  0.173        
  [0.349] [0.351] [0.342] [0.345] [0.500] [0.503]        
Net Portfolio inflow  1.331  1.289  -0.268  -0.326  -0.363  -0.268        
       x (Policy Orientation) [0.860]
12%  [0.860] [0.806] [0.828] [0.633] [0.645]        
Net 'other' inflows/GDP  -0.129  -0.151  0.091  0.09  -0.009  -0.017        
  [0.115] [0.117] [0.081] [0.081] [0.080] [0.081]        
Net 'Other' inflow   0.249  0.251  -0.479  -0.46  0.131  0.11        
       x (Policy Orientation) [0.148]*  [0.150]*  [0.187]** [0.191]**  [0.169]  [0.176]        
Short-term Debt  (as % of  0.099  0.086  0.038  0.03  0.082  0.111        
  total external debt)  [0.047]**  [0.058] [0.044] [0.049]  [0.044]*  [0.050]**       
Short-term  Debt     0.073  0.021  -0.073        
       x (Policy Orientation)  [0.080]  [0.081]  [0.079]        
Total  debt  service  0.217 0.102 0.216 0.199 0.277 0.406        
   (as % of GNI)  [0.100]**  [0.124]  [0.098]** [0.110]*  [0.096]***  [0.117]***       
Total debt service     0.284    0.088    -0.326        
       x (Policy Orientation)   [0.180]
11%   [0.208]    [0.188]*        
Observations  306 306 306 306 306 306       
Adjusted  R-squared  0.72 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.75 0.74       
Robust p values in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 11: Trilemma Configurations and External Financing of Major EMG Countries as of 2007 
 
 
Notes: dX refers to a change of the variable X compared to the 2002-06 period. 
* PCGDP is as of 2006 or 2005 if the figure for 2006 is unavailable.  
** “Swap/IMF” refer to the amount of swap lines provided by the U.S. Federal Reserve on Oct. 29, 2008 as well as the loans provided by IMF as of Mach 
2009. The information on Fed’s swap lines is based on Obstfeld et al. (2009) 
*** In December 2008, China and Japan also agreed to provide Korea with the swap lines of $28 billion and $20 billion, respectively. 
  Financial 
Develop.  Trilemma Indexes  External Finances 
 PCGDP*  IR  dIR  MI  dMI  ERS  dERS  KA-




Argentina  11.4%  17.2%  4.5%  0.74   0.49   0.61   0.29   0.24   -0.08   1.9%  0.1%  2.7%  5.3%  -3.0%  3.6%   
Brazil  32.9%  13.6%  6.0%  0.12   -0.36   0.24   0.05   0.64   0.06   2.1%  0.8%  3.7%  3.5%  1.0%  2.1%  30 (FR) 
Chile  74.5%  10.3%  -7.4%  0.96   0.74   0.35   0.06   1.00   0.07   6.5%  2.5%  -9.6%  -5.7%  -2.9%  -2.8%   
China  135.5%  46.6%  15.7%  0.50   -0.02   0.75   -0.22   0.15   0.00   3.7%  0.9%  0.6%  0.9%  -2.1%  -2.5%   
Colombia  24.5%  10.2%  -1.5%  0.83   0.24   0.17   -0.16   0.39   0.10    4.7%  1.9% 0.5% 1.4% 0.8% 0.6%   
Czech Rep.  37.3%  19.7%  -6.6%  0.16   -0.34   0.38   0.00   0.81   -0.15   4.7%  -1.1%  -1.5%  -0.5%  -0.3%  -2.7%   
Egypt  52.6%  23.6%  3.6%  0.50   0.18   0.64   -0.11   1.00   0.06   8.5%  5.0%  -2.8%  -3.3%  -3.4%  2.7%   
Hong Kong  138.7%  73.9%  2.8%  0.10   -0.11   0.79   -0.21   1.00   0.00   -3.3%  -2.7%  -1.3%  18.8%  -7.7%  -12.8%   
Hungary  51.4%  17.4%  1.0%  0.86   0.24   0.38   0.01   0.81   -0.07   3.2%  -0.1%  -1.7%  -6.3%  4.8%  3.4%  25 (IMF) 
India  40.2%  24.3%  7.1%  0.37   0.21   0.35   -0.14   0.15   0.00                
Indonesia  22.7%  12.7%  -1.1%  0.32   -0.02   0.34   0.04   0.69   0.00   0.5%  0.0%  1.3%  0.0%  -1.1%  0.9%   
Israel  87.5%  17.4%  -4.4%  0.55   0.20   0.28   -0.11   1.00   0.02   1.6%  1.3%  0.2%  2.3%  -3.0%  -0.1%   
Korea  112.5%  27.0%  1.0%  0.93   0.56   0.40   0.06   0.39   0.00   -1.4%  -1.5%  -2.5%  -3.0%  4.3%  3.0%  30(FR)*** 
Lithuania  37.2%  19.4%  2.4%  0.11   -0.12   0.71   0.18   1.00   0.00   3.7%  0.5%  -0.6%  -0.7%  13.3%  7.4%   
Malaysia  110.2%  54.0%  6.8%  0.50   0.06   0.44   -0.46   0.39   0.00    -1.4%  -2.5% 3.0% 1.8% -7.5% -1.9%   
Mexico  19.5%  8.5%  -0.5%  0.90   0.48   0.42   0.09   0.69   0.10   2.1%  -0.2%  1.7%  1.1%  -1.4%  -0.8%  30 (FR) 
Pakistan  26.5%  9.8%  -1.5%  0.51   0.24   0.76   -0.06   0.15   0.00   3.6%  2.0% 1.5% 0.8% 1.9% 2.9%  10  (IMF) 
Peru  17.3%  25.1%  7.6%  0.93   0.76   0.50   -0.05   1.00   0.00   4.9%  1.9%  3.1%  2.4%  0.5%  2.4%   
Philippines  29.0%  21.0%  1.6%  0.10   -0.18   0.37   -0.12   0.45   0.00    -0.4%  -1.6% 3.1% 1.5% -0.5% 2.0%   
Poland  28.6%  14.9%  0.4%  0.13   -0.20   0.37   0.08   0.45   0.00   4.3%  1.5%  -1.2%  -3.0%  6.9%  7.4%   
Russia  26.2%  36.1%  14.8%  0.80   0.35   0.48   -0.07   0.39   0.00    0.7%  0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 6.2% 6.1%   
Singapore  96.1%  101.2%  0.9%  0.52   -0.03   0.51   0.00   1.00   0.00   7.3%  -1.8%  -10.3%  -0.5%  -8.4%  4.5%  30 (FR) 
Slovak  35.9%  24.0%  -9.0%  0.73   0.28   0.39   -0.03   0.76   0.25   4.0%  -3.5%  -1.0%  -1.7%  6.3%  3.8%   
S. Africa  103.6%  10.5%  3.2%  0.97   0.43   0.29   0.12   0.15   0.00   1.0%  0.7%  4.2%  1.7%  2.8%  3.0%   
Thailand  86.9%  34.8%  4.4%  0.19   0.09   0.52   0.11   0.15   -0.24    3.0%  -0.5% -2.8% -3.9% -1.4%  1.6%   
Turkey  28.8%  11.1%  -3.2%  0.02   -0.47   0.31   0.12   0.15   0.00   3.1%  1.7%  0.1%  -1.2%  4.2%  2.0%   
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Figure 4: The Trilemma and International Reserves Configurations over Time: 















































































NOTES: “Emerging Asian Economies” 
include China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. “Emerging Latin 
America” includes Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Venezuela. 
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Figure 5: Development of Individual Trilemma Indexes 
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Figure 6: The Evolution of Trilemma Indexes   
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Figure 7: Policy Orientation of IDCs and LDCs 
(a) Cumulative Effects:  ) ˆ ˆ ˆ (   and   , ) ˆ ˆ (   ), ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( KAOPEN c ERS b MI a KAOPEN c ERS b KAOPEN c MI a ,  ERS b MI a + + + + +  
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(b) Individual Effects  KAOPEN c   ERS,  b MI, a ˆ and ˆ   ˆ  
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Figure 8: Non-linear Effect of Exchange Rate Stability – 1992-96 vs. 2002-06 
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Figure 9: Non-linear Effect of Exchange Rate Stability – 2002-06 vs. 2007-08 
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Note: The Emerging Asian Economies sample includes Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philipines, and Thailand
Emerging Asian Economies and China
 